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Abstract
This paper takes a historical approach to understand the evolution of one of the
most controversial banking regulations in recent history, the Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) of 1978 and its effects on access to credit and banking services to
community borrowers. The paper lays out the historical milieu of credit markets
in the late seventies and describes the early justification of this legislation. The
paper explores the implementation of the act through regulations on lending institutions and the effects of the regulations on depository lenders and community
borrowers. Detailed description of the reactions to CRA regulations by different
parties involved in the act is provided. This reaction and consequent revisions to
the regulations have contributed to keep the act effective and relevant. In addition
to the reactions, the act has responded to the structural reorganization and regulatory changes in the banking sector and mortgage markets in particular. The paper
illustrates this dynamic nature of implementation, reactions and revisions that has
shaped CRA regulations over last quarter century. The paper argues that historical understanding and justification is important to formulate future changes to the
regulation. This understanding is important to keep the act objective, measurable
and enforceable. While inclusion of all possible requirements that may enhance
community lending is not the correct approach to future changes in CRA, keeping
the act static to its initial requirements is also not appropriate from public policy
standpoint. A balance between the two should guide the future changes to the act.
Finally, the paper points out the trends in community lending and suggests some
of the future changes to the regulation.
Journal of Economic Literature Classification: K2, G21, H81
Keywords: Community Reinvestment Act (CRA), Redlining, CRA reforms,
Access to credit

I. Introduction
In the mid-1970's, a view was taking shape among certain members of the United States
Congress. This view attempted to explain the economic decline of inner city neighborhoods
through a process of disinvestment. According to this view, financial institutions that accepted
deposits from households and businesses in these inner city locations focused their lending
activities elsewhere. In other words, certain lenders outlined, later termed as redlined, these areas
by systematically denying credit based on the perceived characteristics of these neighborhoods
rather than actual creditworthiness of borrowers who lived there. The dominant populations in
these outlined areas were often minority and/or low- and moderate-income (LMI) groups. Once
the credit flow dried up in redlined areas, the next step was stagnation and depreciation of
property value and quality due to lack of maintenance and mortgage credit. Lower house values
attracted low-income, generally credit constrained, and often minority borrowers into these areas
and led higher income households to move out. With house value depreciation, neighborhood
quality in terms of public amenities, schooling, crime rates and such other measures also
deteriorated. This deterioration completed the self-fulfilling prophecy of the initial
disinvestments or redlining decision by certain lenders. This view, therefore, suggested that
initial neighborhood disinvestment led to future disinvestments that caused yet further
disinvestments until the community loses its viability.
Broadly speaking, CRA wanted to deter this redlining practice. The act was an addition to the
previously existing anti-redlining legislations. "The act was adopted as a one of a series of
statutes designed to address the problems faced by minority, and low- to moderate-income
groups in obtaining credit and to put a end to redlining - the refusal by lending institutions to
lend or invest in certain geographic areas, frequently the result of racial or economic
discrimination [Regan 1979].” The principal author of CRA, Senator William Proxmire clearly
stated, “The main purpose of the CRA is to eliminate the practice of redlining by lending
institutions [Proxmire 1977].”
Redlining was referred to as a practice whereby “depository institutions would literally or
figuratively draw a red line around certain geographic areas, and decline to make loans in those
areas on the basis of the racial composition, age of the housing stock, or other factors, regardless
of the creditworthiness of the individual loan applicants [Congressional Record 1977].” Renne
[1976] provided a broader definition of redlining as encompassing other forms of adverse
treatment to real estate properties in a designated geographic area including refusal to accept
2

applications, denial of applications, requiring added insurance and approval with onerous credit
terms1. In short, redlining occurs when lenders discriminate against a specific area within its
larger service area by modifying the quantity (number of loans) or quality (terms of loans) of
loans granted to borrowers in the specific area. Although initially redlining was defined in the
context of mortgage lending, in the later years redlining referred to all forms of credit
discrimination against a geographic location as a whole.
The objective of this paper is to understand the historical evolution and future direction of CRA.
Specifically, this paper will follow the debates and controversies over CRA legislation to assess
the present status and future trends of the act. This paper is organized in six sections. In section
II, I explore the historical justification of CRA. In doing so, I describe the effectiveness and
limitations of pre-CRA legislations that attempted to deter redlining. In section III, I focus on the
original CRA statutes, and the regulations that were designed to implement the act. In this
section, I first describe the original CRA statutes in an objective fashion. Since these statues
required the regulators to form implementing regulations, next I look at how regulators reacted to
the act and interpreted it to structure CRA assessment and enforcement criteria based on the
statutory requirements. In section IV, I look at the forces that brought about reforms to CRA. In
doing so, I describe the reactions to the original CRA legislation, and to the regulations that
implemented the legislation by different groups affected by the act. Major groups affected by the
act include the lending institutions and the community groups. Reactions to CRA by opposing
groups formed the primary basis for future reform to the act. In addition to these reactions,
changes in the financial sector and mortgage markets have also contributed to the need to
modernize CRA. This section describes these changes. The focus of section V is to
chronologically describe the past revisions and modifications made to CRA. In section VI, I
synthesize an assessment of the present status and future trends of the act. Finally, the paper
concludes by summarizing what we have learned about the act and what remains to be known.
1

According to Renne [1976], “A mortgage lender redlines a specific geographic area located within the larger
area normally serviced by that lender when it adopts one or more of the following investment policies:
a. Refusal to accept any loan application for real estate loans secured by real property within the
designated area.
b. Refusal to make any real estate loans secured by real property within the designated area.
c. Refusal to make any real estate loans secured by real property within the designated area unless the
loan is guaranteed by some form of mortgage insurance either private or public.
d. Granting real estate loans secured by real property within the designated area only on terms and
conditions more onerous than those for loans on residential property outside the designated area.
These include lower loan to value ratio, larger down payment, higher rate of interest, and shorter
loan duration.”
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II. Pre-CRA, Anti-Redlining Legislations
The United States Congress passed CRA in 1977. In order to understand the essence of the act,
and to create a framework of analysis, it is important to understand pre-CRA federal statutes that
attempted to resist the practices of redlining. The following statutes constitute pre-CRA, antiredlining legislation2:
1.Civil Rights Act of 1866
2. Civil Rights Act of 1964
3. Fair Housing Act of 1968
4. Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) of 1974
5. Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) of 1975
Civil Rights Act of 1866
The Civil Rights Act of 1866 states that every citizen of the United States has the same right to
inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold or convey property, both real and personal [42 U.S.C. § 1982].
In Jones Vs Alfred H. Mayer Co., the Supreme Court found that section 1982 of this act bars
both public and private racial discrimination in the sale and rental of property [392 U.S. 409,
1968]. Unlike discrimination against an individual, redlining is a form of discrimination against a
geographic neighborhood. Whenever the basis of redlining is racial composition of the redlined
neighborhood, it may be considered as public racial discrimination – a form of discrimination
prohibited in the Jones Vs Alfred H. Mayer Co. case. However, in light of the expansive reading
of the legislation, legal experts contended that applicability of section 1982 was limited. “It does
not appear that any court has ruled precisely on section 1982’s applicability to redlining
practices, and it appears that such an expansion of the statute is unlikely [Regan 1979].”
Civil Rights Act of 1964
Title VI of the Civil Rights Act states, “No person in the United States shall, on the ground of
race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefit of, or be
subjected to discrimination under any program of activity receiving federal financial assistance
[42 U.S.C. section 2000d].” In the United State District Court decision of Laufman Vs Oakley
Building and Loan Co., the court held that the extension of home mortgage money was an
activity receiving federal assistance. Thus, denial of a loan based on the racial composition of the
neighborhood is discriminatory within the meaning of section 2000d. Although there was no
discussion by the court as to how it determined that the extension of home mortgage loan was a
2

These five acts mentioned below will be termed henceforth as “pre-CRA legislations”

4

federally assisted program, “it would seem to be a correct conclusion in view of the substantial
federal involvement in the home mortgage market [Regan 1979].”
Some, however, argued that use of title VI of Civil Rights Act to address redlining would be
inappropriate since most of the mortgage loans do not receive direct federal financial assistance.
According to their view, although Federal Housing Administration (FHA)3 and Veteran
Administration (VA)4 loans receive indirect federal support, these loans do not receive federal
finance. Therefore, they should not be covered under section 2000d of the Civil Right Acts.
“Because most mortgages are not funded by the federal government and because federally
insured

mortgages,

including

Federal

Housing

Administration

(FHA)

and

Veteran

Administration (VA) loans are excluded from coverage, the provision’s usefulness as a redlining
remedy is limited [Regan 1979].” Therefore, applicability of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 in
prohibiting redlining practices remained unclear and unresolved.
Fair Housing Act of 1968
Title VIII of the Civil Rights Act of 1968 is commonly known as the Fair Housing Act [42
U.S.C. §§ 3601-3619]. This act prohibits conduct that makes housing “unavailable” to any
person on the basis of race, or that discriminate on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, familial
status, or national origin in provision of services or facilities in connection with the sale or rental
of housing. The act declares that it is unlawful “to refuse to sell or rent after the making of a
bona fide offer, or to refuse to negotiate for the sale or rental of, or otherwise make unavailable
or deny, a dwelling to any person because of race, color, religion, sex, familial status, or national
origin [42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(a)].” The law covers discrimination in all forms of residential real
estate transactions including discrimination in the terms of the transaction. “It shall be unlawful
for any person or other entity whose business includes engaging in residential real estate-related
transactions to discriminate against any person in making available such a transaction, or in the
terms or conditions of such a transaction [42 U.S.C. §§ 3605(a)].”
3

The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) loans are intended as a means to facilitate borrowers, usually LMI
and/or first time buyers, to get a loan with less down payment and liberal qualifying standards. The federal
government does not finance these loans but insures them by means of a Mortgage Insurance Premium (MIP) See
endnotes (FHA loans) for details.
4
More than 29 million veterans and service personnel who served on active duty during World War II and later
periods are eligible for VA loan benefits. Similar to FHA loans, these loans are made by traditional lenders and
guaranteed by the federal government against default. This guaranty encourages lenders to offer veterans loans
with more favorable terms. The Veteran Administration sets guidelines, including the need for veteran's
certificate of eligibility and VA-assigned appraisal, and maximum limit of the guaranty. Unlike FHA loans, VA
loans do not have a minimum down payment requirement or monthly Mortgage Insurance Premium (MIP). In
addition, VA loans may qualify for lower interest rates than ordinarily available with other kinds of loans.
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In 1988, the Congress passed the Fair Housing Amendments Act that significantly expanded the
scope of the original legislation and strengthened its enforcement mechanisms. Under the
amended act, the enforcement of the Fair Housing Act may involve an individual, the Secretary
of the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), who holds the primary authority
and responsibility to administer the act, or the Attorney General of the United States. Under the
law, an aggrieved person could file a complaint with the Secretary of HUD alleging the
discriminatory housing practice within one year after the alleged practice has occurred or
terminated. The Secretary may also file such a complaint on his own initiative. In either case, the
Secretary was required to make an investigation of the alleged practice and complete such
investigation generally within 100 days after the filing of the complaint. The case would then be
tried in a administrative court by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), and if the judge finds that
the alleged party had engaged in a discriminatory housing practice, the judge could issue an
order for appropriate relief. The relief may include actual damages suffered by the aggrieved
person, an injunctive order or other equitable relief, or a civil penalty to vindicate the public
interest. Under the act, an aggrieved person may also commence a civil action in an appropriate
United States district court or State court not later than 2 years after the occurrence or the
termination of an alleged discriminatory housing practice. In addition to these individual
remedies, whenever the Attorney General has reasonable cause to believe that any person or
group of persons have engaged in a pattern of practice of resistance to, or denial of the full
enjoyment of any of the rights granted by the act, and such resistance or denial raises an issue of
general public importance, the Attorney General may commence a civil action in any appropriate
United States district court. For a review of the Fair Housing Amendments Act, see Schill and
Friedman [1999].
Although the Fair Housing Act of 1968 and its amendments in 1988 provide substantial remedy
by prohibiting discrimination in housing sale or rental by the owner or the real estate agent, it
provided no remedy for discrimination against individual or geographic area by the lending
institution. Despite the inapplicability of the Fair Housing Act to discrimination in mortgage
lending, the act is related to redlining two broad ways. First, it separates redlining like outcome
that may occur due to discrimination in sales and rental by the owner of the property from the
redlining outcome that occurs due to geographic discrimination by the lenders. Second, by
separating the ways in which redlining like outcome may occur, this act clearly shows the link
between the housing market discrimination and the discrimination in financial or credit market.
6

This separation also allowed policy makers to focus on discrimination in lending market through
subsequent legislation.
Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA) of 1974
Housing market discrimination can be closely linked with the discrimination in financial or
credit market. The ECOA [15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f] prohibits financial institutions from
discriminating between otherwise creditworthy borrowers on the basis of race, color, religion,
national origin, sex, marital status, age, receipt of public assistance funds or the exercise in good
faith of the rights guaranteed under the Consumer Credit Protection Act5. According to Taibi
[1994], the ECOA may serve two main purposes. First, similar to consumer credit protection
legislations, such as the Truth in Lending Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1677] and the Fair Credit
Reporting Act [15 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1681t], it can serve as a consumer protection statute designed
to provide accurate information to or about consumers involved in credit transactions. Second,
the ECOA can be viewed as an antidiscrimination statute like the Equal Employment
Opportunity Act [42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000s-17] and the Fair Housing Act [42 U.S.C. §§ 36013619] that seeks to promote wider credit availability by prohibiting the use of stereotypes in
credit decisions.
The Act authorizes the Federal Reserve Board to formulate regulations to specify statutory
provisions to achieve the purpose of the legislation. Regulation B, the implementing regulation
for the act, covers all phases of the credit transaction, including the application process, the
evaluation process, and the reporting of reasons for adverse action. Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) administers the overall enforcement of the act. ECOA compliance is enforced by FTC
through issuance of cease and desist orders against non-complying lenders, or by private
litigation through damage actions.
Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) of 1975
Under the leadership of Senator William Proxmire, congress enacted the Home Mortgage
Disclosure Act (HMDA) in 1975 [12 U.S.C. §§ 2801-2809]. The goal of HMDA was “to provide
the citizen and public officials of the United States with sufficient information to enable them to
determine whether depository institutions are filling their obligations to serve the housing needs
of the communities and neighborhoods in which they are located [12 USC 2801(b)].” HMDA
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Consumer Credit Protection Act is a federal legislation establishing rules for the disclosure of the terms of a
loan to protect borrowers. For example, truth in lending Act, which requires lenders to disclose the true cost
of loans and the actual interest rates and terms of the loans in a manner that is easily understood.

7

required depository institutions and their subsidiaries to provide the total number, and dollar
amount of mortgages originated and purchased in the local market segmented by census tract.
The 1989 amendment to HMDA required lenders to report information regarding race, gender,
and income along with details about the disposition6 of the application at the individual loan
application level. The reporting requirement of HMDA extended beyond depository institutions
to all lending institutions with assets of more than $10 million and with an office in a
Metropolitan Statistical Area (MSA) (for depositories) or loan activities in MSA (for nondepositories).
Although disclosure requirements may have influenced lenders’ behavior, HMDA was not
intended to be a prohibitive law. The act did not outlaw any specific actions on the part of
lenders, nor did it impose any penalty for any discriminatory behavior. Instead, the primary
purpose of the act was to monitor and detect patterns of lending behaviors. “While HMDA
provided no mechanism for imposing sanctions on depository institutions, the data were being
collected precisely for the purpose of monitoring lending patterns and detecting neighborhood
redlining [Evanoff and Segal 2001].”
The other key role of HMDA was to provide lending information that could be used in cases of
racial discrimination and redlining. After its passage in 1975, the act has played a significant role
in the enforcement of anti-discrimination and consumer protection acts such as, ECOA and
CRA. The HMDA data have been a key tool for community groups, researchers, and regulators
in assessing the CRA records of depository institutions and the lending records of other reporting
institutions not covered by the CRA [see Litan et. al. 2000].
The Community Reinvestment Act (CRA) of 1977
In the previous paragraphs, I have looked at the pre-CRA, anti-redlining legislation. These bills,
however, remained indirect or inadequate in addressing redlining. The Civil Rights Act of 1866
and 1964 addressed redlining in an indirect fashion. The Civil Rights statutes were read very
broadly to address only some specific types of redlining. For example, it was required to show
that mortgage loan as a form of government assistance to make redlining illegal under the Civil
Rights Law of 1964. The Fair Housing Act of 1968, on the other hand, prohibited discriminatory
practices exclusively in rental and sales components of housing market. The Fair Housing Act
did not encompass discriminatory practices in mortgage lending or other forms of credit such as
6

Disposition of application includes acceptance, denial, withdrawal or closing of the file and must include the
reasons for denial.
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consumer loans, small business and farm loans. The Equal Credit Opportunity Act (ECOA)
became the most appropriate statutory tool among all the existing pre-CRA legislations in
dealing with redlining. Despite this appropriateness, the link between ECOA and redlining
remained indirect. ECOA prohibited use of eight criteria in the credit lending decision. Those
criteria were: race, color, religion, national origin, sex, marital status, age, receipt of public
assistance funds and the exercise in good faith of the rights guaranteed under the Consumer
Credit Protection Act. Under ECOA, none of these prohibitive factors can affect lenders’
decision to approve credit to individual borrowers. Redlining, on the other hand, was a form of
geographic discrimination against a neighborhood. Therefore, ECOA could not be a direct
remedy for redlining.
Besides the problem of protecting individual, but not the group (neighborhood residents), there
were other difficulties in the application of ECOA in redlining cases. One of these difficulties
involved showing the basis of redlining. It is almost impossible to show the exact basis of
redlining, since the ways in which redlining may occur are often inter-connected and correlated.
For example, when a lender’s racial prejudice towards minority borrowers is generalized and
reflected as prejudice towards the neighborhood with high concentration of minorities, and the
lender acts on this prejudice by engaging in redlining, then we may call this a race-based
redlining. Since ‘race’ is a prohibitive basis under ECOA, the act might have potential
application in this circumstance. However, there can be at least two reasons why ECOA may not
be useful. First, minority populations are often low-income groups who live in older houses. In
other words, minority status is highly correlated with low-income borrowers residing in older
houses. However, neither ‘income’ nor ‘age of the house’ is prohibited as a basis for credit denial
under ECOA. Thus, race-based redlining can be correlated and indistinguishable from ‘income’
or ‘age of the housing units’ based redlining making the application of ECOA very difficult.
Second, in a race-based redlining, geographic discrimination takes place against minoritydominated neighborhoods. Therefore, non-minority who live in the minority-dominated, redlined
neighborhood cannot seek remedy by using the protection of ECOA. The non-minority,
however, suffers equally from geographic discrimination.
Lending standards7 that are discriminatory in effect violate the ECOA even in the absence of any
intent to discriminate, unless the standards “achieve a genuine business need which cannot be
7

These standards include bases that are not prohibited by ECOA such as lending based on income or the age
of house.

9

achieved by means which are not discriminatory in effect or less discriminatory in effect [12
C.F.R. § 531-538].” This is known as disparate impact discrimination. This provision of ECOA
may address some aspects of redlining in an indirect fashion. In that, implementation of the
standards that are not prohibited by ECOA but disproportionately affects minority in the redlined
neighborhood are discriminatory and illegal unless lenders show a genuine business need in
favor of these standards. The difficulty that arises when applying this provision is with the
interpretation of what constitute a genuine business need. Moreover, when lenders shows a
legitimate business need the burden to show the existence of other lending standard that are nondiscriminatory or less discriminatory in effect, but achieves the same business need shifts to the
party that accuses the lender for disparate impact discrimination. Finally, this indirect way to
address redlining prohibits the effect on minority population but not the action directly.
The original Senate bill of CRA, sponsored by Senator William A. Proxmire, was introduced in
January 1977 to provide a more direct legal mechanism to address the economic deterioration of
communities through disinvestments and to encourage lenders to invest in the LMI communities.
What the proponents of CRA wanted to achieve by passing this bill can be summarized in two
parts. Part a, lenders need to serve their local community in which they are chartered by looking
for sound, profitable and suitable investments in the community. Part b, in doing so lenders must
invest in the entire community, including low- and moderate-income (LMI) neighborhoods.
According to part a, CRA was enacted to encourage banking institutions to help meet the credit
needs of their local communities. The principle of serving "the convenience and the needs" of the
communities was embodied in the federal law of deposit insurance, bank charters, and bank
mergers long before CRA was passed into law. Moreover, in acting on acquisitions by banks and
bank holding companies, the Bank Holding Company Act of 1956 requires the Federal Reserve
Board (FRB) to evaluate how well ‘the convenience and the needs’ of the communities were met
within the limits of safety and soundness. Thus the encouragement to financial institutions to
serve their local community and help meet credit needs in the community as required in part ‘a’,
is in many respects an existing responsibility of depository institutions. Part ‘b’ of the act deals
with redlining or geographic discrimination by requiring lenders to invest in the entire
community.
The CRA statute provides a broad outline for the federal supervisory agencies to implement the
act. The Act specifies some general directions on how the encouragement to serve the needs of
the entire community should be provided and how the act can be enforced when lenders fail to
10

act on the encouragement. The most significant enforcement mechanism to tie the requirements
of meeting the credit needs of community to the consideration of lenders’ application for federal
approvals [see endnotes]. In the next section, I take an objective look at the provisions of CRA,
and analyze how regulators reacted to it and formed regulations to implement its goal.

III. The Original Act, Reactions and Implementing Regulations by the
Regulatory Agencies.
This section describes the original CRA statutes as passed by the Congress and implementing
regulations formed by the regulators as objectively as possible. In this section, I will also
describe the reaction of regulators toward the original statues. CRA statutes were directed at two
relevant groups: the lenders, and the federal regulators. I will shortly define lenders that fall
under the coverage of CRA, and according to the lending activities of these lenders, which
regulatory agency supervises those lenders.
The Original Act
In simple terms, the act required lenders to “help meet credit needs of the entire community,
including low- and moderate-income neighborhoods in a manner consistent with safe and sound
operation of the institution8.” This is the goal or objective of the act. The success or failure of the
act can be evaluated in relation to this objective. The act imposed three responsibilities on the
regulatory agencies. First, to ‘encourage’ lenders to achieve the goal of the act, second, to
‘assess’ lenders’ performance in achieving that goal, and finally, to ‘consider’ the CRA
performance when evaluating lender’s application for mergers, expansions and other regulatory
approvals.
Coverage of CRA: CRA covers almost all depository-lending institutions. All state member
banks, state nonmember banks, national banks, savings and loan associations (S&Ls) and
wholesale and limited purpose institutions9 fall under the coverage of CRA. There are certain
lenders that are excluded from CRA coverage. CRA rule specifies that “special purpose
institutions, such as banker's banks [12 U.S.C. 24], that are not organized to grant credit to the
public in the ordinary course of business and institutions that provide only cash management and
8

Title VIII of the Housing and Community Development Act of 1977, Pub L 95-128; 91 Stat. 1147, 12 USC
2901-05].
9
An institution is a wholesale institution if it is not in the business of extending home mortgage, small business,
small farm, or consumer loans to retail customers. A limited purpose institution offers a narrow product line, such
as credit card or motor vehicle loans, to a regional or broader market.
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controlled disbursement services be excluded from CRA coverage [60 FR 22156].” Lenders that
are exempt from CRA coverage are mortgage companies, trust companies, credit unions,
correspondent banks and clearing agents. Mortgage banks are not traditional depository lenders
and are exempt from CRA coverage. The other exempted lenders are either ones that do not
extend credit to broad general public, such as trust companies and credit unions, or the ones that
provide only cash management and disbursement services to lending institutions such as
correspondent banks and clearing agents. Therefore, although some exemption to CRA
obligation exists, the majority of depository lenders are covered under the act.
CRA Regulators: The following federal regulatory agencies are required to enforce the CRA:
1. The Federal Reserve Board (FRB)
2. The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC)
3. The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC)
4. The Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS)
These federal regulators were responsible for examining the financial condition, and safety and
soundness of operations of the banking industry long before the enactment of CRA. In addition
to their regular supervision and examination, the CRA responsibilities were included based on
the preexisting allocation of responsibilities. Original CRA statutes clearly identify the part of
banking industry that will be supervised by each of the above four agencies10.
After a considerable debate and a defeated attempt to delete the provisions of CRA in the House
Banking Sub-committee, the provisions of CRA were finally included in the Housing and
Community Development Act of 1977. After its passage by the senate in the October of the same
year, the act required the regulatory agencies to devise appropriate regulations to carry out the
responsibilities directed upon them. “Regulations to carry out the purposes of this chapter [CRA]
shall be published by each appropriate Federal financial supervisory agency, and shall take effect
no later than 390 days after October 12, 1977 [12 USC 2905].”

10

The statute states, “the appropriate federal financial supervisory agency means (a) The Comptroller of the Currency with respect to national banks;
(b) The Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (FRB) with respect to State chartered banks
that are members of the Federal Reserve System and bank holding companies;
(c) The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) with respect to state chartered banks and savings
banks that are not members of the Federal Reserve System and the deposits of which are insured by the
Corporation; and
(d) The Director of the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTC), in the case of a savings associations (the
deposits of which are insured by the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation) and a savings and loan
holding company [12 USC 2905].”
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The Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council (FFIEC) is a formal interagency body
empowered to prescribe uniform principles, standards, and report forms for the federal
examination of financial institutions. This body makes recommendations to promote uniformity
in the supervision of financial institutions by the Federal Reserve System (FRB), the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), the National Credit Union Administration (NCUA), the
Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC), and the Office of Thrift Supervision (OTS).
This Council was made responsible to promote consistency of the implementation of CRA
regulations as well.
Regulators’ Reaction to the Original Act
In broad terms, the responsibilities of regulators were of three fold. First, to encourage lenders to
help meet entire community credit needs (Section 802(b)). Second, to assess the CRA
performance or CRA compliance of lenders in meeting that credit needs (Section 804(1)), and
third, to consider this performance when evaluating lenders’ applications for federal approvals
(Section 804(2)). The difficulty faced by the supervisory authorities in carrying out their
responsibilities can be grouped under following categories.
Vagueness of the Responsibilities: CRA requires banks to help meet the entire community
credit needs by a safe and sound lending practice. This requirement is, in simple terms, the goal
of the act. The act requires regulators to encourage banks to achieve this goal. The act also
requires regulators to assess the success or failure of banks in achieving this goal and if it is
found that a bank failed to achieve the goal, it requires regulators to consider this failure when
bank seeks federal approvals.
In order for regulators to perform their duties as required by the act, regulators must encourage
lenders to help meet the credit needs of entire community. Before the encouragement is
provided, the regulators, however, need to know whether encouragement is at all needed. In
other words, regulators must assess if there are unmet needs for credit in the community and if
lenders can meet that demand in a safe and profitable way. However, “the congress did not
provide any standard for determining whether a bank is meeting the local community’s credit
needs [Marisco 1993].” If it is discovered (by some hypothetical standard) that certain banks are
failing to meet the community’s credit needs, regulators are required to provide encouragement
to meet the need. The Congress, however, does not provide what the nature of the
encouragement would be. “The act states that banks should be encouraged to ‘help’ meet
community credit needs but does not specify how such encouragement is to be provided or how
13

much help in meeting credit needs is expected [Lindsey, February 1993].”
From regulators point of view, the vagueness of the responsibility stems from the fact that
encouraging banks to do something or to undertake some venture does not necessarily mean
requiring them to do it. “It (the act) encourages but does not require action by financial
institutions. It reminds banks and thrift institutions about their charter obligations but does not
mandate any particular activities [Lindsey, February 1993].” The word ‘encourage’ in the act is
rather vague and ambiguous that makes the other regulatory responsibilities such as assessment
of performance and enforcement of CRA obligations, more difficult. If encouragement were to
mean some specific affirmative obligations then encouragement could have been done
effectively, and assessment and enforcement of the act could have been much easier.
The act also remains unclear when it requires regulators to consider CRA performance in
assessing lender’s application for mergers, expansions and other regulatory approvals. This
really does not help regulators much with regards to what the consequence of poor performance
should be. What is clear from the language of the statute is that poor CRA performance will
negatively impact future regulatory approvals. The act, however, does not say how much weight
must be given when poor CRA performance determined. “It leaves to the agencies the task of
determining what the consequences of poor performance will be and when and how those
consequences will be applied” [Lindsey 1995]. Moreover, federal approvals such as mergers and
acquisitions have separate criteria and justifications. For example, an acquisition might be
justified to rescue a failed institution. However, it was not clear where the poor CRA
performance falls among the already existing criteria. In other words, if the failed institution or
the acquiring institution has a poor CRA record, would approval for acquisition still be justified?
Lack of guidelines: CRA statutes were framed very broadly, and in its guidance towards
regulators, it lacked completeness. “Even on some simple but important matters such as what
constitutes as institution’s community, whether banks should be judged on credit extended to
low- and moderate-income persons or only to borrowers in low- and moderate-income
neighborhoods, the act provides little help to regulators, bankers, or community representatives.
[Lindsey 1995]” The act provided little guideline on assessment and enforcement of the statute.
“Despite the lofty pronouncements, the act provided little guidance as to how bank regulators
should evaluate bank performance in this regard and how often these examinations should take
place. [Apgar and Duda 2003]” Other researchers noted, “The act sets no criteria or guidelines
for assessing the performance of an institution. It does not explain how an institution’s
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“community” should be selected, how credit needs are to be determined, how to define low- and
moderate-income neighborhoods, or what constitutes satisfactory compliance. [Garwood and
Smith 1993]”
The act left specific details of assessment and enforcement to be formulated by supervisory
agencies. In order to form implementing regulations from such broad guidance from the
legislature, the supervisory agencies sought public opinion. They held public hearings in 1978 to
gather suggestion on possible interpretation and implementation of CRA. The suggestions
received from different groups varied widely. While consumer groups favored specific rules,
such as loan-to-deposit ratio for evaluation purpose, the lending institutions expressed concern
about the possibility of federally mandated credit allocation. Although public hearings did not
provide complete guidance, it helped the regulators understand the varied viewpoints concerning
CRA.
Lack of Definition of Terms: As mentioned earlier, although the terms like ‘encourage’,
‘community’, ‘low- and moderate-income neighborhoods’, or ‘community credit needs’ stated in
the act were not new to the regulators, they needed precise regulatory definition. “Four agencies
have been particularly troubled by the absence of statutory definitions for such terms as ‘entire
community’, ‘credit needs’, and ‘low- and moderate-income neighborhoods’ [Jackson 1978].”
Furthermore, “the CRA directs the supervisory agencies to assess bank performance in helping
meet community credit needs, but it does not define good CRA performance [Lindsey, February
1993].” These terms were essential components of CRA enforcement.
The precise definitions of those terms were fundamental for community activists as well. In
order for the activists to raise substantial protest, they needed to know how banks were suppose
to operate as far as their CRA responsibilities were concerned. “The operative terms are
‘encourage’, ‘consistent with safe and sound operation’, ‘local communities’, and ‘meet the
credit needs’. The CRA does not contain further definition of these terms [Marisco 1993].”
In order to determine some measurement criteria for the degree of compliance or noncompliance, these important terms must have precise and consistent interpretation. Regulators
had to define these terms and certain other concepts such as good CRA performance. They
developed twelve performance factors, as discussed under Regulator’s Responsibilities below, by
which CRA compliance would be measured.
Conflicts in the Objective of the Act: The objectives of CRA examinations might involve
conflicting goals. On the one hand, the act needs to be flexible that allows considerable judgment
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on the part of the examiners to account for unique characteristics of the institutions and its
community. On the other hand, for the effective enforcement, CRA examination needs to be
consistent. The federal regulators describe the need for flexibility as “preservation of examiner
judgment to take into account the unique characteristics and needs of an institution's community
and the institution's own capacity and relevant constraints are essential for a workable rule [60
FR 22156].” Flexibility and consistency, however, can be contradictory when regulators achieve
flexibility by compromising consistency of the examinations.
This conflict may be related to another conflict of CRA objectives. Specifically, the conflict
between flexibility and consistency can take the form of a conflict between ‘desire for
objectivity’ and ‘dislike for credit allocation’. An objective, quantifiable criterion for assessing
CRA performance is a desirable public policy objective that contributes to the consistency of the
CRA examination. Strict enforcement of the quantifiable rules for performance assessment,
however, may turn out to be a governmentally mandated credit allocation scheme, which is not
intended by the act. As Lawrence B. Lindsey, member, Board of Governors of the Federal
Reserve System, puts, “Consistency and objectivity are laudable goals. But to be implemented in
a regulatory scheme, they require both a set of statistical data and a formulaic basis for
evaluating those data. The more rigid the formulas that are applied, the greater the consistency
but the lower the variety of outcomes and allowance for local circumstances that is permitted.
[Lindsey 1995]” Therefore, objectivity and not mandating credit allocation can be two
competing goals, in that one cannot be achieved without compromising the other.
CRA Regulations
The regulators developed detailed CRA regulations to implement the intent of a simple and
broad act of only a few pages. Although each of the regulatory agencies has supervisory
responsibility for different parts of the lending community, all of them have adopted similar
regulations to implement CRA. To formulate regulations for the act, all four regulatory agencies
announced a series of hearings11 on the regulations. Both oral and written testimony was taken in
March 1978 and the proposed regulations12 were published in July 1978. After receiving and
considering voluminous written comments on the proposal, final regulations13 were adopted in
1978.
11

For details of these hearings see 43 Federal Register 3370-3372 (1978), 43 Federal Register 7243-7244 (1978)
and 43 Federal Register 13074(1978).
12
See 43 Federal Register 29918-29924, 1978.
13
See 43 Federal Register 47144-47155, 1978.
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All four regulatory agencies jointly published almost identical regulations. The purpose of these
regulations was to encourage and to provide further guidance to lenders as to how agencies will
assess lenders’ records in satisfying their continuing and affirmative obligations to help meet the
credit needs of the local communities. The regulations required every lender covered under CRA
to prepare and maintain two items as a part of disclosure requirement. Those are:
(1) CRA Statement
(2) CRA Public Comment File
CRA Statement: CRA statement is a set of documents concerning each lender's community
lending efforts. Under the requirement of the act, lenders are required to prepare and publish a
formal CRA statement for each community it serves.14 Documents included in a CRA statement
can be divided into two components: (a) Essential components and (b) Suggested components.
(a) Essential Components The CRA statement must include at least the following three items:
1.

The delineation of the community

2.

A listing of specific credit programs the lender presently offers to its community
including any limitations on availability of such programs.

3.

A copy of CRA public notice.

(b) Suggested Components In addition to the essential item, regulators also encouraged the
lenders to expand CRA statement by including some or all of the following items:
1.

A description of how lender’s current efforts, including special credit-related programs
help to meet community credit needs.

2.

A periodic report regarding its record of helping to meet community credit needs.

3.

A description of lender’s efforts to ascertain the credit needs of its community.

CRA regulation required that each bank’s board of directors must review its CRA statement at
least once annually, and act upon any changes to the statement in its first regular meeting. Every
thing enclosed in the CRA statement was made available to public. The CRA statement was
readily available for public inspection at the home office, and at each branch office of the bank
except off-premises electronic deposit facilities. Copies of current CRA statement must be
provided to the public upon request, and bank may charge a fee that must not exceed the cost of
reproduction. Next, I will look at three essential documents of the CRA statement more closely.
14

Although the word ‘community’ was referred in the act on numerous occasions, no precise definition of the
word was given. To enforce CRA and to assess lenders’ performance the word community, however, needs a precise and

clear definition. The regulators defined community by requiring lenders to delineate their respective community. The
community delineation was a component of CRA statement and is discussed in the following paragraph.

17

Community Delineation: This is the first item of the CRA statement. CRA regulation required
each lender to create a map that delineates its local community with reasonable clarity. This
delineation would be a boundary of operation that outlines the areas around each branch or group
of branches in which a lender offers services. Each branch or a group of branches of a bank must
have one local community. One community, as a whole or a part of it, however, can be included
in the community delineation of two or more different banks or branches of same bank. Banks
were allowed to make adjustments in their community boundary in the case of operation areas
that were divided by state borders or significant geographic barriers or areas that were extremely
large or of unusual configuration. The lenders were required to review its delineation at least
once in a year. The regulators in their annual CRA performance evaluation would closely
examine the reasonableness of the delineation.
The crucial factor in the examination of community delineation was the exclusion low- and
moderate-income (LMI) [see endnotes] neighborhoods from their local community. Since the
goal of CRA is to encourage lenders to meet the credit needs of the entire community, the
delineation of community can have a fundamental impact on the evaluation of CRA performance
and on the enforcement of CRA obligations. A lender's CRA compliance is evaluated on the
basis of its lending activities inside the local community. If some neighborhoods were not
included in lenders’ community delineation, lenders were not required under CRA to extend its
service in those neighborhoods. Therefore, categorical exclusion of certain minority or LMI
neighborhood from lender's community - an act known as ‘redlining’ - was carefully examined
by regulatory agencies.
List of the Credit Programs: Lenders were asked to be as specific as possible when listing the
credit programs that they were prepared to extend within its local community. For example,
“residential loans may be broken down into residential loans on single-family homes, residential
loans on one- to four-unit properties, and residential loans on properties with five or more units.
The breakdown can be even more detailed by listing whether such loans are offered in an insured
or uninsured basis [Schieber and Replansky 1991].” Banks were also asked to be specific about
the type of loans that were currently offered including any limitation that applies. The types of
loans include housing rehabilitation loans, home improvement loans, small business loans, farm
loans, community development loans, consumer loans etc.
CRA Notice: CRA regulation required public posting of CRA notice in a specific form
mandated by the regulatory agencies. This notice provided community borrowers with
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information on how to obtain current CRA statement of the particular lender. It also provided
instructions on how an individual can make signed and written comments about the lender’s
CRA statement, or its community lending performance. The notice clearly stated where the
public comments file (the second item maintained by the lender) containing all signed and
written comments received by the lender, responses to these comments made by the lender, and
effective CRA statements of past two years are located. The notice explicitly stated how any
interested individuals could access the public comment file. The notice also stated how to obtain
the regulator’s CRA-related comments on the lender’s CRA performance, and how to request an
announcement of applications for federal approvals currently filed by the lenders from the
respective regulator. CRA notice, a component of publicly available CRA statement must also be
separately posted in the main lobby of each lender’s branch offices and at its main office.
Beside CRA statement, the other document maintained by the bank or designated branch of the
bank15 is a public comment file. Similar to the CRA statement this is also a publicly available
document. This file contains “any signed, written comments received from the public within the
past two years that specifically relate to any CRA statement or to bank’s performance in helping
to meet the credit needs of its community or communities. [Federal Register vol. 43 No. 198.
October 12, 1978].” In this comment file, lenders will also include any responses to the public
comments, and effective CRA statements of past two years. The public comment file, in its
entirety, is maintained at the main office of the bank, and materials relating to each local
community are maintained at a designated office in that community.
Regulators’ Responsibilities under CRA: The responsibilities of the regulators can be divided
in three major parts:
a. Information Gathering
b. Performance Assessment and
c. Enforcement of the law in case of non-compliance
Information Gathering: The original CRA imposed only a limited disclosure requirement16 on
lenders, data reported under Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA, see endnotes) served the
primary source of information for the purpose evaluating home mortgage loans in CRA
15

In case of multiple branches in one local community only the designated branch maintains the public comment
file. Note, if two branches of one bank operate in the same community, then besides bank’s main office, only one
of the two branches (the designated branch) maintains the public comment file that has comments pertaining to
the whole community.
16
Further data reporting requirements were imposed as a part 1995 modification to CRA. The new reporting
requirements are discussed in section IV.
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assessment. Under HMDA, the lenders were required by their respective supervisory agencies to
collect information on the residential mortgage loans made in its’ community. This information
included loan amount, volume, location and borrower characteristics such as, racial origin, and
income level. The location of the borrower and of the property provided important information
about the neighborhood characteristics (low-, moderate- or high-income neighborhood). The
coverage of lending institutions under HMDA is larger than that of CRA. The broader coverage
of HMDA allowed regulators to impose no reporting requirements under CRA with regards to
residential mortgage lending. A list of relevant information used by the regulators and the
sources of that information is given below.
Table 1: A list of relevant information used in the CRA examination
Relevant Information
Loan amounts, number and types

Source
HMDA

Loan location and some borrower characteristics HMDA
Distribution of loans across the neighborhoods in HMDA
the
community, racial and income groups.
Public comments on CRA statement and
CRA performance, and bank’s response

CRA Public comments file

Appropriateness of the delineation of bank’s
lending community.

CRA statement

Specific credit programs offered by the bank

CRA statement

Proactive effort of the bank in fulfilling
CRA obligations.

CRA statement

Bank’s involvement in the community

Direct contact with community groups and
Members.

The above table gives a general idea about the sources of information for the regulators.
Generally, CRA examiners gathered lender-specific information from HMDA data, and
information reported under the CRA public disclosure requirements17, through communications
with local community leaders and development organizations, and through outreach and
marketing efforts of the banks. Guttentag and Wachter [1980] mention some sources of
information that are also used by the regulators including “the public file in the CRA statement,
board of directors’ minutes, interviews with officers and community groups, HMDA reports,
17

Under public disclosure requirements, lenders were required to maintain CRA statement and public comment
file. Components of CRA statement include community delineation, specific credit program and public notice.
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loan policy statements and manuals, application logs and other records.”
Information collection and disclosure by the lender may serve two purposes. First, lending
information is used in the assessment of CRA performance. Second, since the law requires that
part of the information be disclosed to the public, the disclosure may make banks more
accountable to its depositors. Negative public comments or poor CRA performance may damage
the reputation of the depository institutions and consequently may cause the loss of deposits. For
example, some local governments have established programs in which they have required the
deposit of public funds to be made with only institutions having satisfactory or better CRA
performance [GAO 1995].
Performance Assessment: The act remained exceptionally broad and general in its instruction
to the regulators with regards to their responsibility of assessing CRA performance of lending
institutions. The regulatory agencies were required by the act to evaluate the community lending
records of the institutions they supervise as part of their examination process. In their evaluation,
the act asked them to assess the degree of compliance with the goal of the act, where the goal of
the act is to help meet the credit needs of entire community with safe and sound business
practice. Therefore, it can be assumed that the higher the degree of compliance, the better would
be the CRA performance. The act, however, gave no indication how the agencies were to
accomplish these tasks. In this section, we will see how the regulators formed uniform
interagency CRA regulation to facilitate the assessment process.
To help facilitate the assessment of CRA performance, the regulators jointly instituted CRA
examination procedures. A regulatory agency would review an institution’s CRA performance at
different time frames depending on the past performance record of the particular institution.
While lenders with satisfactory or better CRA performance were reviewed at the regular
scheduled examination, or once in every two years, lenders with lack of compliance could be
reviewed on a yearly basis, or even more frequently. CRA compliance was evaluated on twelve
specific factors. These factors were organized into five categories as listed below. Detailed
performance factors under each category are listed in the endnotes:
Category A: Ascertainment of community credit needs.
Category B: Marketing and types of credit offered and extended.
Category C: Geographic distribution and record of opening and closing offices.
Category D: Discrimination and other illegal credit practice.
Category E: Community development.
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Regulators were required to assign ratings on a scale of one to five for each of these twelve
factors, where one implies the highest rating. Banks receiving composite ratings of three, four,
and five were to subject of scrutiny and frequent examinations. Although the individual lender’s
composite rating was not released to public, supervisory agencies prepared and released a
summary of each lender’s overall CRA performance ratings in the region, and it was posted in
the CRA public file.
Institutions were not required to adopt a particular activity just because it was a factor for
evaluation of CRA performance. The performance factors were not designed to serve as rigid
lending rules, rather they were to provide lenders with some suggestions and guidelines for
community lending. “While we do not favor the imposition of extensive and rigid guidelines, it
is helpful to provide covered financial institutions with suggested assessment factors as
guidelines to enable them to comply with the act. Given the great variety of local conditions, the
list of factors is intended to be illustrative. [Jackson 1978]” The rigid guidelines were not
suitable for CRA lending since “responsibility under the CRA may be met in a variety of ways,
including lending for business, agriculture, education, consumer, home purchase and home
improvement and to finance state and local governments [Federal Register, 1989].” In fact, CRA
regulations were designed to give banks maximum flexibility in determining how they can best
meet the credit needs of their communities. “Considerable latitude is given to the banks and
thrifts to choose the ways in which they will fulfill their obligations to their communities
[Jackson 1978].”
The regulation encouraged banks to become innovative in marketing their products and to devote
valuable resources for research on finding the potential investment opportunities in their
particular community. “The Agencies believe that appropriate consideration should be given to
an institution that makes ongoing efforts to ascertain the needs of its entire community, develop
products and services, and market those products and services throughout the community
[Federal Register 1989].” In order to gain understanding of these investment potentials, lenders
were expected to develop closer relationships with community groups and individuals and to
participate in community development activities. Therefore, regulators rightly stated that “It
(CRA) compels us (regulators) to look beyond what happens within the bank itself, focusing on
the role the bank plays in the community. We must look at a bank’s participation in fostering
economic growth and revitalization [Garwood and Smith 1993].”
In conducting a CRA performance evaluation, the examiner is expected to judge the performance
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of each bank on a case-by-case basis. Examiner needs to consider two specific factors:
1. Bank-specific factors
2. Community-specific factors
The bank-specific factors would imply characteristics such as, size, net worth, type, expertise,
capability or any legal impediments of the bank in serving the credit needs of the community.
The institution has the “discretion to develop the types of products and services that it believes
are best suited to its expertise and business objectives and to the needs of its particular
community, as long as the institution’s program is consistent with the objective of the CRA
[Federal Register, 1989].” A bank with a large net worth and capital will be in a better position to
devote resources to community outreach and to understand growth potentials of the community
compared to some other smaller bank in the community. Therefore, an examiner may justifiably
put heavier burden on these banks with regards to community outreach efforts towards local
government, business, organizations and community members.
The community-specific factors imply the characteristics that are associated with local
community such as, size of the community, its potential for economic growth, existing local
businesses, and potential for commercial and residential developments. In addition, the examiner
needs to consider that two different banks may address the same need in a community
differently. Therefore, the examiner must take a balanced approach in determining compliance to
CRA. A poor performance in one factor should not imply non-compliance, and similarly an
excellent performance in one assessment factor may not constitute successful compliance.
CRA did not prohibit any activity of the lenders, nor was it intended to encourage unsafe lending
and credit allocation. In designing CRA legislation, the Congress understood that direct
interference in the market process to allocate credit would cause distortion and potential
inefficiency in lending markets. They also realized that each community is different in terms of
its economic potentials. In dealing with two relevant issues18 the Congress had to give up some
clarity in their guidance. This lack of guidance may make the distinction between what
constitutes the ‘encouragement to meet community credit needs’ and what implies ‘federally
mandated credit allocation’ harder. This lack of clarity forced regulators to work between a fine
line of encouraging institutions to extend CRA credit and that they do so in specified amounts or
types, or under prescribed terms [Garwood and Smith 1993]. In order to maintain this subtle, but
18

The issues are (a) to allow competitive and free market process to work and (b) to exploit community-specific
differences and unique economic potentials.
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important distinction, "supervisory agencies adopted joint regulations that reflected two
principles: 1) the regulation should not require lenders to allocate credit, and 2) financial
institution should be free to meet their CRA obligation in different ways to reflect the needs of
their communities, their own capabilities, and the activities of their competitors [Canner and
Passmore 1995].”
Enforcement of CRA: Enforcement of CRA obligations is accomplished through three different
mechanisms. These are: (1) denial of application, (2) disclosure of performance and (3) public
comments and protests. In the denial of application, regulators were directed to consider past
CRA performance of the lenders when evaluating applications for federal approvals [see
endnotes] by these lenders. Denial or conditioning of approval on the ground of poor CRA
performance constitutes the primary enforcement mechanism of the act. Therefore, this
enforcement mechanism does not affect the poor CRA performers immediately, but rather it
affects the lenders only when they need to apply for expansion or consolidation of the scope of
their business or product lines.
Disclosure is another vital component of CRA enforcement. Community-lending records of the
lenders in a region are summarized and disclosed to the public in the public portion of the
performance evaluation19. This disclosure of performance and consequent loss of reputation was
intended to contribute in changing the lending pattern of the CRA-covered institutions.
Public or local community plays a key role in the third enforcement mechanism. The provision
of public comments on lenders’ community lending performance and protests related to pending
applications for federal approvals makes the lender accountable to its local community. At the
same time, these comments and protests bring out important information about the needs of the
community. This information and interaction between lender and community also make the
enforcement process possible. In the absence of this interaction, it would have been impossible
for federal regulators to discern the vastly diverse needs and perspectives of the community
members and lenders operating in the community.

Section IV: The Forces behind the CRA Modernization
Over the years, CRA regulations have undergone many revisions, amendments and
19

In the later years, the scope of this disclosure provision was extended; 1989 modernization of CRA required
disclosure of composite ratings for each individual lender. GLB sunshine requirement further required lenders and
other parties receiving CRA related grants from the lender to disclose the transfer in a specific format. These new
disclosure requirements are discussed in section IV.
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modifications. To understand the future of CRA, it is important to understand these revisions and
their basis. One of the effective ways to understand the basis for these revisions is to identify the
forces behind the revisions. This section identifies three broad forces that influenced past
revisions, and will continue to affect future modifications of the act. These forces are: (1)
Reactions of the lending institutions, (2) Reactions of the community groups, advocates and
individual, and (3) Changes in the trends of the lending industry. Details of these forces is
summarized in the following table:
Table 2: Forces of CRA modernization
Forces of CRA Modernization
1. Reaction of the Lending
Institution

Short Description
a. Subjective nature and vagueness of the act
b. Unfairness of the act
1. Unfairness among banks and non-banks
2. Unfairness within banks
a. Due to location
b. Due of specialization
c. Due to future expansion plans
c. Burdensome and expensive
1. Pre-protest expense
2. Post-protest expense
d. Discourages banks to serve the depressed
neighborhoods.
e. Acts as a form of regulatory tax
f. CRA induced lending may conflict with the
safety and soundness standards
e. Ignores specialization and may become inefficient

2. Reaction of the Community
Groups

a. Lack of enforcement
b. Misplaced emphasis on documentation
c. Protective behavior and grade inflation
d. Lack of authority
e. Lack of public disclosure
f. Inadequate examination

3. Trends of the Lending Industry

a. Weakening link between branch-based deposit
gathering and mortgage finance.
b. Technological advancement and breakdown of
financial barriers.
c. Growing importance of securitization and expanding
shares of loans originated through mortgage banking
operations.
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Discussion in this section is organized under these three forces. First, I will examine the
reactions of the lending institutions. In that, I describe at how CRA was welcomed or criticized
by the lending institutions by looking at their reactions to the original act, and to the regulations
passed by the regulators to uphold the goals of the act. Second, I consider the reactions of
community members, groups and advocates. Finally, I identify the changes in the trends of
lending industry and mortgage market that made the modernization of CRA inevitable.

IV.A. Reactions of the Lending Institutions
Original CRA was directed towards the lending institutions and the regulators of these
institutions. Based on the original act, all four regulatory agencies formulated almost identical
implementing regulations for the CRA-covered lenders. Therefore, the lending institutions
expressed their reactions to both the original act as passed by the congress and its implementing
regulations designed by the regulators. Some of the reactions of the lending community to the
original act were similar to the reactions of the regulators described in the previous section. The
lenders’ reactions to the original act that were not similar the regulators’ reaction and the
reactions to the implementing regulations of CRA can be addressed under following headings:
Subjective Nature and Vagueness of CRA The lenders thought that essential provisions of the
original CRA and implementing regulations were essentially subjective and vague. Some of the
basic difficulties faced by lenders concerning CRA can be summarized in questions like, ‘how to
determine community needs?’, ‘how to meet those needs?’ and ‘how much help to be rendered?’
These are questions are subjective and judgmental. In his statement before the subcommittee on
financial institutions and consumer, Lawrence B. Lindsey points out that “The act says that
banks should ‘help’ meet community credit needs, but it does not specify what kind of help, or
how much help, is necessary or appropriate [Lindsey 1995].” What is appropriate for lenders,
may not be enough for regulators, or not acceptable for community groups.
One of the difficulties in implementing CRA is related to the conflicts of subjective judgments of
the lenders, the community groups and of the regulators. Given the limitations of community
characteristics and the lenders’ resources and capabilities, what the lenders should do within the
boundary of safe and sound operations to fulfill CRA responsibility relies heavily on their
subjective judgments. The nature of the law recognizes and allows such judgments. This
judgment, however, will be examined and rated by the regulators and may be protested by the
community individuals, who may have a conflicting judgments about the lenders community
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lending activities. I believe the lack of clarity in the original act is a primary source of these
conflicting judgments.
The lending institutions thought CRA regulations remained vague in many respects. CRA
requires lenders to help meet the entire community credit needs by safe and sound operation. In
order to fulfill this responsibility, lenders need to know their community. First, they need to
determine the credit needs in the community they serve. Although CRA regulations and
assessment factors for CRA examination provide some guidelines, they do not provide specific
details on how ‘community credit needs’ should be determined. Communications with
community leaders, advocates and developers may provide the bank officials some sense of the
community credit needs, but there is no specific rule or criteria to single out these needs. As
some researcher points out that “following passage of the act, bankers frequently complained
about the vagueness of the requirements, including the lack of a specific ranking or weighting
scheme for the assessment factors to guide the allocation of resource [Evanoff and Segal 1996].”
Second, if needs determined by the lenders are more than the credit currently provided, the
lenders are required to determine a safe and sound way to address this need. As described earlier,
due to conflicting subjecting judgments, the way and extent to which the credit needs should be
met may vary from the lenders to the community groups, or the lenders to the regulators. Finally,
lenders need to know how different means to address theses needs are weighted in the evaluation
process. However, the act does not specify in what order, and to what extent helping to meet
these needs is required by the act.
The vagueness and lack of clarity exacerbates the problem of subjectivity described earlier.
Specifically, the vagueness of the provisions adds subjectivity to the compliance. In the absence
clear guidance, the lenders comply according to their subjective judgment, but the regulators
assess the compliance with their own, but different subjective judgment. The lack of clarity and
consequent conflict of the subjective judgments makes the compliance to CRA controversial and
may transform CRA into an open ended lists of demands by the community groups. “The
vagueness of the term “credit needs” easily lends itself to an open-ended “wish list” approach by
community organizations that lobby regulators [White 1993].”
Although the regulators provided guidance in terms of the documents that must be maintained
and assessment factors upon which lenders will be assessed during examination process, some
researchers consider that the broad nature of and lack of clarity in the original act made the
regulatory responsibilities difficult to undertake. “The vagueness of the affirmative
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responsibilities placed on the lenders by the congress has made it difficult for the regulatory
agencies to determine compliance with CRA [Canner and Passmore 1997].” In many
circumstances, while working with the broad guidelines, the regulation designed by regulators
remained vague as well. Therefore, the source of this ambiguity experienced by the lending
institutions can be traced back to the vagueness in the original act.
Unfairness of CRA The lenders argued that CRA was unfair legislation for certain lenders
because it did not cover the entire lending institutions in a uniform fashion. The alleged
unfairness can be addressed under two following grounds:
1.

Unfairness among banks and non-banks.

2.

Unfairness within banks.

Unfairness among banks and non-banks Although CRA covers a substantial portion of
depository lenders, it did not include the whole lending industry. Generally, the lenders covered
under CRA are: commercial banks and thrifts20. This coverage was not made arbitrarily. Sound
logic existed for imposing CRA obligations on certain type of lenders as opposed to all lenders in
general. Depository charters already required banks and thrifts to serve the “convenience and
needs” of the local communities in which they were allowed to do business. One can identify the
four justifications for imposing CRA obligations on depository lenders. They are: (a) these
lenders receive deposits from their community, (b) they are the primary source of credit to their
community, (c) they enjoy protection from federal deposit insurance, and (d) they enjoy access
of credit from Federal Reserve System who acts as a lender of last resort.
Statement of senator Proxmire, the main author of CRA, identifies this justification. “This public
obligation (The CRA) was the quid pro quo for the substantial economic benefits conveyed on
chartered depositories: a franchise to do business in a geographic area, federal deposit insurance,
access to the payment system, and access to low cost credit through the Federal Reserve Banks
or the Federal Home Loan Banks [U.S. congress 1977a].” Others involved in the regulatory
process have offered similar justification, “although they are privately capitalized, banks and
savings institutions are subject to an underlying charter obligation to serve the banking needs of
their local communities. These public obligations form the quid pro quo for the extensive
government backing that is provided to these types of financial institutions [Fishbein 1993].”
Opponents of CRA have attacked all four justifications mentioned above. They argue that these
justifications or ‘charter-benefits’ have lost their substance under present financial environment
20

Savings and loan associations (S&LA) and savings banks are commonly known as thrifts.
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where banks and non-banks are hardly distinguishable in terms of financial operations. Imposing
CRA obligation on banks but leaving non-banks out of the obligation renders banks into a
seriously disadvantageous position. This, according to the opponents of CRA, is the unfairness
among the banks and non-banks. This section explores these unfairness arguments.
In the late seventies, when CRA was enacted, the depository institutions benefited from an
effective monopoly in the consumer checking and savings markets. Federally chartered
depository institutions did not have to pay interest on checking accounts. “At that time banks and
savings and loans operated under a system of below-market prices for deposits - no interest for
checking accounts and an administrative ceiling for time and savings accounts, with savings and
loans allowed to pay a little more than banks - that can aptly be described as a cartel
administered and enforced by federal government [Macey and Miller 1993].” Things have
changed drastically since then. Increased competition has broken the so-called cartel. Banks and
thrifts now compete with other non-banks for consumer savings. “The most significant of these
non-bank competitors are mutual funds, many of which today offer extensive checking
privileges. Other firms - even industrial corporations - are offering services that perform most of
the same functions as the checking account at the bank [Macey and Miller 1993].”
The growing sophistication and modernization of the capital markets fostered vigorous
competition among banks and non-banks. Big mergers and acquisitions throughout last decade
have produced giant financial companies. Currently, the distinction between banks and large
non-bank financial companies is eroding. Both types of institutions are allowed to perform
similar activities in terms of accepting consumer savings and making loans. For example,
General Electric (GE) capital can fund itself with short-term money costing about the same as
bank deposits.
The ability to raise deposits that have explicit government guarantee is one the exclusive charterbenefits enjoyed by depository institutions. This guarantee comes with the cost of insurance
premiums and heavier regulatory supervision. This federal insurance of deposits forms the
primary building block for the overall safety and soundness of depository institutions. The
opponents of CRA argue that even the exclusive benefit of government safety net is not
exclusive any more. Other non-banks, especially the larger non-banks, also fall under the safety
and soundness umbrella of government. In that, although these non-banks don’t benefit from an
explicit guarantee of government, they receive an implicit guarantee.
The implicit guarantee flows from the public responsibility of Federal Reserve Board to mitigate
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financial panic, and to restore trust in the overall financial institutions. Out of this responsibility,
the Fed undertook the massive bailout of Long Term Capital Management in 1988. Most people
now believe that many large institutions are probably protected under the category of “too large
to fail.” This belief is crucial for the safety and soundness of financial system, and must have
contributes to GE’s ability to acquire funds at approximately the same cost as federally
guaranteed deposits by banks.
The fourth benefit, ‘the lender of the last resort’ notion of Fed has been used very rarely, and
only under special circumstances. The implicit guarantee of federal safety net, and the ability to
raise deposits allow non-banks to compete with the banks without worrying about CRA
obligations, examinations or associated CRA protests. According to the opponents of CRA, the
act is unfair for banks, since it puts banks into a competitively disadvantageous position that
might have serious safety and soundness implication. “An increasingly serious difficulty with the
CRA is that the fact that it burdens certain types of institutions while favoring others - thus
impairing the safety and soundness of those that suffer disproportionately under the act [Macey
and Miller 1993].”
Unfairness within the bank Within the depository institutions, CRA compliance costs are not
same for all covered banks. The cost differential and consequent unfairness may come from
following sources:
1. Location of the bank
2. Specialization of the bank and
3.

Future expansion plan of the bank.

Location of the bank CRA requires banks to serve the credit needs of the entire local
community including LMI neighborhoods. Since CRA was designed to prohibit banks from
practicing redlining, the word community, which is dictated by some reasonable delineation of
bank’s service area, is critical here. For example, banks located in wealthy areas with no LMI
neighborhood in its local community do not have to serve LMI neighborhood located outside
their local community. Since LMI neighborhoods are the primary source of CRA protests, these
banks would face lesser CRA challenges than banks that have one or more LMI neighborhoods
in their service area. In this way, CRA provides an unfair advantage to banks that do not serve
LMI neighborhoods, and penalizes banks that do serve. Due this disparate treatment, banks with
future expansion in mind would choose to avoid areas with LMI neighborhoods. In the very early
days of the act, regulators realized that under the legislative environment of CRA, banks might
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be inclined to take such a strategy. In his 1977 letter to senator Proxmire, Robert R. Barnett,
Chairman of the FDIC warns about this impact of CRA by following statements: “The practical
effect of the bill could be to discourage financial institutions from making applications for
offices in neighborhoods where funds are badly needed because of the reexamination that this
would entail. ……The result of this would be to increase present concentration of financial
institution offices in more affluent neighborhoods [Cincotta 1977].”
Specialization of the bank If all depository institutions are treated alike with regards to their
CRA obligations, and are expected to perform equally well in their community reinvestment
efforts then banks that provide specialized services, such as wholesale and limited purpose
banks, will find themselves in a competitively disadvantageous and economically inefficient
position.21 To perform equally well in CRA examination with lenders that deliver full range of
financial services, these specialized banks will have to incur additional cost. The excess cost for
not being equipped with manpower, expertise and community knowledge might well be
considered as unfair burden for their specialized nature.
Future expansion plan of the bank Banks that are planning to expand and grow through
merger, acquisition, opening and relocating branches need federal approval for such activities.
CRA regulation requires regulators to consider prior CRA performance of the bank seeking such
approvals. At the same time, community activists in the bank’s service area take this impending
approval as an opportunity to thoroughly scrutinize a bank’s CRA efforts. This stringent scrutiny
and therefore increased threat of CRA protest put expanding banks in disadvantageous setting.
The expanding, or reorganizing banks would need to devote more resources and services than
other banks to receive comparable CRA score. If the degree of scrutiny and threat to protest
becomes too high then this threat might act as an effective entry barrier favoring larger banks
that has already expanded. The cost differential for between banks with no intention to expand or
already expanded, and banks that are planning to expand or reorganize might be considered as
unfair for the latter.
Costly documentation and protest resolution Complying with CRA obligations can be
expensive. CRA related expenses could be divided into two parts:
1. Pre-protest expenses and
2. Post-protest expenses.
21

The 1995 CRA revision directly responded to this reaction by formulating CRA examinations specific to the
lenders’ specialized nature of business.

31

Pre-protest expenses These expenditures are associated with the cost of compliance to CRA and
its regulations. These expenses include the cost to maintain, report and disclose CRA related
documents. The federal banking regulators have estimated the annual paper work burden of the
CRA at approximately 600 hours for large institutions and 10 hours for small institutions
[Federal Register 1999]. While documents, such as CRA public notice, CRA statement, and
public file are strictly required by law, many other documents are also maintained as supportive
materials to convey positive CRA performance. These supportive materials may include minutes
of meetings of the bank’s board members, communications with community groups and
organizations, clippings of articles announcing or recognizing the lender for participation in the
community programs, thank-you notes and acknowledgements for bank’s CRA related efforts,
and awards and certificates of appreciation. Federal regulators during their CRA examination
may have to rely on these documents. “Enforcement agency examiner will frequently have
nothing to go on other than the documentation provided be the bank. If the documentation is
spotty or raises more questions than it answers, the examiner will be forced to go elsewhere for
documentation. To avoid this, a lender should make a special effort to collect and retain all
documents or other materials supporting its positive CRA performance [Schieber and Repansky
1991].”
The other type of pre-protest expense is associated with lender’s time and efforts devoted
activities that seek to understand the community credit needs. These activities include enhanced
marketing efforts, community outreach, special program and innovation of new product to suit
the community’s needs. One study estimates “labors--including staffing to pinpoint areas and
investments that meet these requirements--can cost an institution with $500 million or less in
assets 4.5% of their pretax profits [Thakor and Beltz 1994].” Although these activities demand
time, efforts and expense on the part of lenders, they may have positive contribution to the profit
and good will of the lenders. Therefore, it is not straightforward to measure the cost or benefit of
these activities; in the compliance-cost calculation, one must account for the benefits of these
activities. Some argue that CRA compliance cost should include the costs of developing and
maintaining formal CRA policies, including employee training on anti-discrimination, and other
requirements of fair housing laws. According to some researchers, however, such training and
policy statements are not exclusive requirement of CRA. As Litan et. al argue that “..costs that
institutions incur to comply with related statutes, such as the anti-discrimination laws and Home
Mortgage Disclosure Act may not be considered as a part of CRA compliance costs [Litan et. al.
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2000].” According this view, anti-discrimination, fair housing and civil rights laws require these
activities, and lenders should provide the training to comply with these laws for their own
interests.
Post-protest expenses Expense in this category arise when any interested individual or group
such as a single individual borrower, a community group or the appropriate federal regulator
protests a bank application under CRA grounds. The cost of post-protest expense depends on the
amount of time it takes to resolve the protest, the bargaining powers of the protesting entity, and
how urgently the bank finds its application for federal approval needs to be processed.
Historically, CRA related post-protest expenses have not been excessive. “Based on the data
provided by the four banking regulators from 1995 through 1998, less than one percent of total
bank and thrift institution applications covered by the CRA received adverse comments (roughly
600 out of 86000 applications). Furthermore, only one percent of the applications that received
adverse comments were denied by the regulators, 94 percent were approved, and the other five
percent were withdrawn or returned for additional information [Litan et. al. 2000].” Delay in the
approval of application may cause loss to the banks actively seeking growth and expansion. The
opportunity cost of delay is the loss of profit that accrues from the expansion. In addition to
opportunity cost, there is post-protest expense include cost of negotiation with protesting groups,
which includes additional manpower, paper work, lawyers, and sometimes commitment of
assistance in terms of loans and grants to achieve a compromise. In recent years, the bargaining
powers of community groups, which negotiate as professional collective bargainers, have
become quite strong. Since 1993, banks and thrifts have pledged to make over $1 trillion in home
mortgage, small business, and community development loans for LMI neighborhoods and
borrowers. Since then banks and thrifts have made well over $600 billion of such types of loans
[Litan et. al. 2000]. In addition to these accounting costs, another significant post-protest cost is
the damage to reputation and public image of the protested institution.
Discourages Banks to Serve the Depressed Neighborhoods It has been argued that CRA
provisions can be counter productive by discouraging banks to enter in credit-depressed,
generally LMI neighborhoods, in which the banks would otherwise enter in the absence of CRA
regulations. In that, protest provision of CRA makes it difficult for banks to close branches in
distressed neighborhoods. While this may benefit some people, it has an unintended negative
effect. It discourages other regulated institutions from entering and offering banking services to
the neighborhoods that are often dominated by LMI and minorities borrowers. Consequently,
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people who could benefit from checking, savings, consumer loans, and other banking services
may be denied of these benefits. Antonakes [2001] in recent years finds some support of the
negative relationship between the concentration of minority population in the tract and the
number of banks that serves the tract. Using 1995 data for the state of Massachusetts, he finds
that as the percentage of minority in the census tract increases, the number of lenders that include
the tract in their assessment areas falls.
CRA induced loans may help some borrowers in the short run, but these loans may hurt other
lenders in the neighborhood and consequently, the borrowers in the long run. The loans made by
banks attempting to obtain approval for merger or acquisition may simply draw customers from
other lenders who otherwise would have made them, perhaps, on less beneficial terms. “In
particular, minority-owned banks have complained that they suffered from having to compete
with subsidized lending by banks that are willing to make unprofitable loans to obtain regulatory
approval for a merger or acquisition [Ferguson 2000].” Once the approval is received these
lenders would reduce their CRA lending, but in the meantime other existing lenders in the
neighborhood might not survive in the competition for subsidized lending.
Acts as a Form of Regulatory Tax CRA has been viewed as a form of regulatory tax imposed
on depository institutions. CRA enforcement mechanism allows interested parties to cause
considerable loss through delay or denial of applications. As argued earlier, if the damage caused
by potential delay or denial is higher than the loss in making CRA- induced subsidized loans, the
lenders will prefer making subsidized and often unprofitable loans. As Lacker [1995] argues, “by
tilting banks’ profit-loss calculations, the CRA regulations give banks an incentive to make loans
they would not otherwise have made. To the extent that banks are induced to make loans and
investments they would not otherwise have found profitable, the CRA regulations encourage
banks to subsidize lending in low-income neighborhoods.” Lacker [1995] cites Senator
Proxmire’s justification for CRA obligation on banks that “there is no way the Federal
Government can solve this problem [of revitalizing the inner cities] with its resources”, and
argues that CRA imposes a tax on banks to avoid an explicit general tax increase. However, a
general tax increase is usually less costly to society than an equal-sized tax on a single industry
because spreading the burden over a wider base minimizes the resulting distortions in economic
activity. Similar arguments of cross subsidy appear in other research. “Banks cannot meet their
CRA obligations to provide such services [CRA induced loans] unless they are able to earn
above-normal profit elsewhere, thereby making up for the losses in the CRA-induced area. In
34

essence, banks must be able to cross-subsidize internally the CRA-induced services; otherwise,
the banks will incur overall losses or inadequate profits [White 1993].” However, some
researchers find that although CRA-eligible loans by CRA covered institutions carry lower
mortgage spreads than other loans by the same institution, after controlling risk and benefit
effects this spread becomes economically and statistically insignificant [see Canner et. al. 2002].
CRA Induced Lending May Conflict with the Safety and Soundness Standards Although
CRA regulation required lenders to make safe loans to fulfill their CRA objectives, according to
some scholars CRA-induced credit enhancement objectives aimed at increased supply of loans to
low-income neighborhood might conflict with financial safety and soundness criteria. In that,
aggressive banking strategies tend to help CRA ratings but may hurt safety and soundness
ratings22. Gunther [2002] study finds evidence of conflict between CRA compliance, and safety
and soundness standards especially for smaller lenders. In particular, the study shows that
concentrating bank’s assets in loans tends to help CRA ratings but hurt CAMEL ratings, holding
management quality constant. This study also finds limited evidence to suggest that greater focus
to low-income neighborhood helps CRA ratings, but at the expense of safety and soundness.
CRA might have induced less than safe underwriting standards. CRA induced pledges and
lending commitments are often directed toward a national network of bank protest groups who
receive the underwriting authority on behalf of a bank. This process has provided a pool of
capital at the disposal of these protest groups. Opponents of CRA have raised concerns about the
soundness of these groups’ underwriting performance. One such group is Neighborhood
Assistance Corp. of America - a Boston-based community organization. This group has received
"delegated underwriting authority" by Bank of America for more than $3 billion in mortgage
funds. “In the mid-1999, 8.2% of all mortgages that this group had arranged with Fleet Boston
were delinquent, compared with the national average of 1.9% [Ferguson 2000].” Similar
concerns were expressed by the last Senate Banking Chairman Phil Gramm when he comments,
"CRA lending is significantly less profitable than ordinary lending, and the most unprofitable
CRA loans are those that are made through special deals with CRA specialists and other third
parties [Congress Daily].”
The non-profit lenders have also been blamed for their lax and often unsafe underwriting
standards. Opponents of CRA believe that to the extent these loans are CRA induced, the act is
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Federal regulatory agencies evaluate safety and soundness of regulated lenders by examining six factors:
capital adequacy (C), asset quality (A), management (M), earnings (E), liquidity (L) and sensitivity of market risk
(S). This CAMELS ratings system existed before CRA examination was introduced in 1978.
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responsible for unsafe lending, which in the long run may hurt the neighborhoods and its
borrowers. “Nonprofit lenders--whose experience, of course, does not lie in judging credit risk-are unabashed in their goal of qualifying just about anyone who walks into their offices. The
result? When one or two or three houses on a block go into foreclosure, or even if they don't get
the paint job they need because the buyer is overextended, the original CRA goal of
neighborhood revitalization is undermined, not advanced [Ferguson 2000].” According to these
opponents, easy credit only transforms good neighborhoods to become bad neighborhoods and
bad neighborhoods to stay that way.
Ignores Specialization and may become Inefficient Although lenders’ rights of exercising the
discretion over the type of loans and the degree of risk to be assumed have been affirmed by
federal regulations, CRA provisions indirectly tends to undermine this right. “The community
groups do not accept the right of lenders to specialize by not offering the full range of services
within their legal authority [Guttentag and Wachter 1980].” Furthermore, CRA regulation
requires lenders to fulfill their CRA obligation in a uniform fashion. This might have implication
on efficiency of providing banking services. “CRA-enforced homogenization of services reduces
the ability of lenders to specialize, and is therefore likely to reduce operating efficiency,
particularly for smaller banks [Guttentag and Wachter 1980].” According to some researchers,
this uniform requirement may undermine and underutilize the informational skills of the efficient
lender and fails to exploit the expertise of the lenders who are efficient in certain types of lending
[see Richardson 2001].

IV.B. Reaction of Community Groups, Advocates and Individuals
Community groups, advocates and individuals have reacted to the provisions of CRA. Similar to
lenders’ reactions, these reactions are also directed toward the original CRA statutes as well as
the regulations implemented by the regulators. Many of the reactions of the community groups
and individuals are identical to the reaction of lending institutions including vagueness of the act,
lack of definitions, and excessive burden of paperwork and documentation. These common
concerns are discussed in the reaction of the lending institutions. Besides these common
concerns, the reactions of the community groups and individuals can be grouped under the
following categories:
Table 3: Reaction of the community groups
Forces of Modernization

Short Description
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Reaction of the Community
Groups

a. Lack of enforcement
b. Misplaced emphasis on documentation
c. Protective behavior and grade inflation
d. Lack of enforcement authority
e. Lack of public disclosure
f. Inadequate examination

Lack of Enforcement Community groups have complained about the lack of aggressive
enforcement of CRA provisions, and argued that this lack has contributed to the lack of credit in
the LMI neighborhoods and consequent disinvestment of these neighborhoods. “Community
advocates argued that the acts were either inadequate or inadequately enforced and that banks
continued to channel deposits away from local communities, resulting in inadequate financing
for the areas most in need [Evanoff and Segal 1996].” Indeed, in its first decade of CRA, most
lenders have received satisfactory or better rating and no application of lenders were denied on
CRA ground. In 1988 Senator Proxmire, Chair of the Senate Banking Committee, reports in a
public hearing that “despite the apparent rigor of the criteria, fully 97 percent of the institutions
examined over the period received one of the two highest ratings (on a five-point scale) [Ford
Foundation 2002].” In 1989 after twelve years since the passage of CRA, the first application
was denied on CRA grounds. It was the merger application of Continental Bank Corporation to
acquire Grand Canyon Bank of Scottsdale. In another report, “there were only 11 CRA denials of
more than 50,000 branch and merger applications from 1977 to 1989; by 1996, there were just 31
denials out of nearly 105,000 applications [Thomas 1998].”
Although consideration of the CRA ratings during the application approval process constitute the
primary enforcement mechanism for CRA, the prevalence of favorable ratings, and the small
number of CRA-related denials does not provide conclusive evidence of lack of enforcement.
Although these two criteria may provide an initial indication of lax enforcement, we need to
account for other factors as well. Reasons for not observing denials may depend on other factors
including actual performance of lending institutions in terms of providing credit to LMI
neighborhoods, and a financial and regulatory environment that permits and promotes
consolidation of the industry. Other legal, financial and economic considerations for federal
approvals, ability of lenders to improve its lending records before the application is submitted,
and negotiation with the protesters after the application is submitted can also reduce the number
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of denial of application on CRA ground23. Although these pre- and post-application
considerations affect the number of denials and may explain the lack of actual denials, most
community advocates and members believe that “it is not the lack of laws, but rather lackluster
enforcement of the CRA, that has contributed to the continuance of neighborhood disinvestment
and lending discrimination [Fishbein 1993].”
Misplaced Emphasis on Documentation Federal regulators, in their guidance towards lenders,
often emphasized the importance of maintaining documentation of lenders’ CRA related efforts
or strategies. “Regulatory agencies would periodically issue policy statements providing
guidance to institutions as to how the assessment criteria were scored and discussing elements of
effective CRA programs. Most of these statements emphasized efforts, and the documentation of
such effort [Evanoff and Segal 1996].” In the assessment of performance, regulators have taken
of both the effort and the result of the efforts into consideration. Effort to comply with the act
includes strategy used to serve the local community, and maintenance of convincing documents
reflecting that effort had been made to assess the needs of the community. “CRA performance
evaluations focused on the processes used and efforts made by institutions to serve their local
community as well as on the result of those efforts [Bostic and Canner 1998].” Both the lenders
and community groups have criticized the amount of documentation involved in CRA
compliance, although for different reasons. For the lenders burden of documentation is of
primary concern. “Lenders contended that CRA enforcement was needlessly burdensome
because it was focused on process and paperwork, and that the examination standards were
unclear and inconsistently applied [Bostic and Canner 1998].” For the community groups, on the
other hand, the documentation is ineffective and has diminished regulators’ ability to distinct
good lending performance from the poor performance, “Community groups believed that the
examination process failed to create meaningful distinction between depository institutions with
good performance and those with poor performance [Canner and Passmore 1997].”
Protective Behavior of the Regulators and CRA Grade Inflation Community groups and
individuals have criticized the protective behavior of regulators toward the banking institutions.
“Almost from the outset, community advocates criticized the way in which the regulators
enforced the CRA. The agencies were viewed as being too cozy and too protective of the
23

Often times we do not see a lot of actual denial of applications because lenders who submit applications for
regulatory approval take adequate preparation by improving their CRA lending record. Further, these lenders may
commit for loans and grants, before the application is submitted or during the protest and negotiation phase, to the
neighborhoods in which they do not have satisfactory lending records.
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institutions they supervise to enforce the new requirements effectively [Fishbein 1993].” In
recent years, complaints about these protective behaviors and the instances of grade inflation in
CRA performance evaluation have become frequent. According to some scholars, certain
changes in the 1995 CRA reform24 have contributed to the grade inflation. These scholars think
that reform that has instituted three separate tests - lending, investment and service test - for large
retail banks have taken fifty percent weights away from the lending performance and provided
that weight to investment and service performance. By proving independent weights to
investment and service test, CRA evaluation process has inflated the ratings. Specifically, they
claim that investment test is the primary cause of overall CRA grade inflation. An analysis actual
CRA examination shows that under the new tests, “large banks finds 71 percent of the ratings
were inflated by one grade on the investment test, compared to 32 percent and 29 percent
comparable inflation rates for the lending and service tests, respectively [Thomas 1998].”
Lack of Enforcement Authority As discussed earlier, regulators are required to consider prior
CRA performance of the lenders who apply for expansion through merger, consolidation, closing
or relocation of branches. This forms the primary enforcement mechanism of CRA. This,
however, is an indirect form of enforcement in the sense that the poor CRA performance
adversely affects the lenders only when they apply for federal approvals. Further, approval of
application has other considerations besides the CRA performance, and it is not clear how these
considerations are weighed. Community groups have complained about the limited enforcement
authority. “Community groups have raised concerns about limited CRA enforcement,
particularly against poor performers that have no plans to expand, and insufficient disclosure of
information on banks’ community lending performance [GAO 1995b].” Some scholars have
attributed the lack of authority as a primary reason for reduced effects of CRA by saying “The
failure of the CRA to have a more pronounced effect on lower income lending lay largely in its
failure to provide regulators with tools to punish poor performers or reward successful behavior
[Apgar and Duda 2003].” In response to this indirect enforcement process, community advocates
have proposed to enhance CRA enforcement through direct sanctions. The Department of
Justice, however, issued an opinion in late 1994 stating that such actions are not within the scope
of CRA statues. Consequently, the proposal for direct action for noncompliance with CRA was
24

Community groups have complained about the grade inflation associated with the CRA evaluations process
that are based on the original CRA regulations. After the 1993 reform, some scholars claim that the reform has
contributed to further grade inflations. Details of 1995 CRA reform initiatives have been discussed in the next
section.
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dropped from the consideration.
Lack of Public Disclosure of Information on Performance Evaluation Until 1989
modernization of the act25, the CRA rating and how the rating was derived were not disclosed to
public. Although people could participate in the community lending process by commenting on
an institution’s lending record, or protesting against an impending merger, they had no way to
know how the regulators had evaluated the institution. The lack of disclosure of information has
important consequences. First, when the performance rating is not available to the public,
reputational risk of lenders is limited. This reduced risk may diminish lenders’ incentive to
improve their CRA performance. As some scholars put, “reputational risk and public scrutiny
faced by lenders for poor performance was minor because examiners’ ratings were not made
public [Apgar and Duda 2003].” Second, accountability of the examiners is absent or limited
when public has no way to know the rating or how a particular rating is derived. Finally, nondisclosure of rating may render participation of community incomplete or ineffective. For
effective participation in the community development, that intends to improve the flow of credit
into a disinvested community through comments and protests, community groups, advocates and
individual need to know and understand the evaluation process.
Inadequate CRA Examination that may have contributed to the Growth of Abusive
Lending Practice Proponents of CRA have expressed their concern about abusive lending
practices generally known as predatory lending26. The growth of subprime lending that has the
potential to become predatory has been substantial in recent years. According to some scholars,
CRA examination process may have indirectly helped the growth of such lending practices. The
subprime lending are primarily concentrated in low-income and minority population, and
therefore, have the potential to score positive points in CRA lending test. “The sub-prime market
has experienced dramatic growth over the last decade, and research indicates that the sub-prime
market includes a significantly higher percentage of minority, particularly African-American
borrowers; a significantly higher percentage of low-income borrowers; and a higher share of
borrowers of living in underserved areas [Haag 2000].” However, CRA examination process
rarely looks into the price and terms of these loans. Therefore, loans to LMI borrowers with
25

The 1989 CRA modernization required public disclosure of ratings and performance evaluation explaining
the basis of the ratings. This provision directly addressed these concern.
26
Predatory lending, according to Immergluck and Wiles [1999], are mortgage lending practices that may include
charging excessive fees and interest rates; fraudulent, high-pressure, or misleading marketing; and ‘flipping’ or
overly frequent refinancing with repeated fees being rolled into the loan, resulting in increased debt and reduced
owner’s equity.
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abusive terms and hidden fees may get as much CRA credit as, or in some cases better CRA
credit than other community development loans. To fulfill CRA obligations, and to enhance
CRA ratings, rational lenders may find it more profitable to purchase these loans or MortgageBacked Securities (MBS) that include these loans. Inadequate CRA examination allowed lenders
to extorts high-risk borrowers and still receive credit in the CRA evaluations. This provision of
CRA and it unintended effects are criticized by the community advocates.

IV.C. Changing Trends of the Financial Industry
The past decade has experienced a dramatic restructuring of the lending industry and mortgage
market operations. These changes have directly affected many aspects of how CRA obligations
are defined, and how CRA assessment and enforcement are implemented. In this section, I look
at these changes, and analyze how they affect CRA under following categories:
Table 4: Trends of the lending industry
Forces of Modernization
Trends of the Lending Industry

Short Description
a. Weakening link between branch-based deposit
gathering and mortgage finance.
b. Technological advancement and breakdown of
financial barriers.
c. Growing importance of securitization and expanding
shares of loans originated through mortgage banking
operations.

Weakening Link between Branch-Based Deposit Gathering and Mortgage Finance
Restructuring and streamlining of the mortgage lending operations, and consequent growth of
mortgage bankers, mortgage brokers, independent mortgage companies and other secondary
market players have revolutionized the way mortgages are originated and financed. One aspect
of this restructuring is a weakening of the link between mortgage lending and branch-based
deposit gathering. In 1980, thrift institutions originated approximately 50 percent and
commercial banks originated 22 percent of all one-to-four family home mortgages. In that year,
mortgage companies and other lenders originated the remaining 28 percent. This indicates the
importance of branch-based deposits and deposit-taking institutions in mortgage finance. In
recent years, however, branch-based deposits no longer serve as the primary source for mortgage
funds. By 1997, mortgage companies became the dominant player in the market for one-to-four
family home mortgages by originating 56 percent of all loans. In that year, thrift institutions
originated only 19 percent, and commercial banks captured 25 percent of the same market [HUD
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1997]. Yezer [1994] points out, “The notion that local depository institutions should be the
primary mortgage lenders in a local area is outmoded. The rise of the secondary mortgage market
has eliminated the relation between the originator of mortgages and the ultimate mortgage
investor, whose identity is merged into national mortgage pools.”
This shift of the dominant role from branch-based, deposit-taking institutions to mortgage
companies has implications on the rationale, and the enforcement of CRA. The CRA obligation
was imposed on depository institutions, and this obligation had a geographic dimension.
Depository institutions were required to serve the credit needs of the community in which they
maintain branches. Banks’ community, where banks were obligated to serve, was defined
according the location of its branches. The rationale for branch-based community definition was
based on a strong link between branch-based deposits and community lending. During the time
when CRA was enacted, the depositors/savers did not have many savings options besides saving
with their local depository or savings bank. At the same time, local borrowers did not have many
options to raise funds other than borrowing from local savers. CRA recognized this close link or
inter-dependency, and attempted to prohibit the channeling of deposits from local community to
elsewhere. As some scholars put, “The CRA’s initial focus on areas where CRA-regulated
institutions maintained branches made sense because restrictions on interstate banking and
branching activities were limiting the geographic scope of mortgage-lending operations [Apgar
and Duda 2003].” Over the years, however, this link has eroded. With the erosion of this link, the
rationale for branch-based community definition and geographic scope of CRA obligation has
lost its ground.
CRA enforcement mechanism was also designed with this link in mind. Currently, CRA
regulations require most stringent examination of lending performance for the covered
institutions inside their assessment areas, where the assessment area is defined in relation to the
location of branches. CRA examination is much less strict for the covered institutions outside
their assessment areas. However, given the gradually weakening link between branch-based
deposits and all lending, under this present enforcement system, the major participant in the
mortgage origination market remain outside the regulatory reach of CRA. “To the extent that the
geographic focus for evaluating banks’ CRA performance continues to be the area surrounding
physical facilities (even if they be more modern incarnations such as supermarket kiosks for
ATMs), then a growing portion of bank lending and other activities will fall outside the purview
of CRA review [Haag 2000].”
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Clearly, although the link between branch-based deposits and mortgage lending has weakened
over the years, CRA examination has continued to focus on this already-eroded link. Under the
present financial system, deposits simply are not the only, or even the major, source of mortgage
funds, and depositories are not the only institution successful in attracting deposits. The
argument that deposit-taking lenders receive all the deposits and these lenders are the primary
source of mortgage funds, therefore, they should be required to serve their community is not very
relevant any more. Changes in the mortgage markets and future trends in the industry structure
call for modernization of CRA. Some have suggested the redefinition of bank’s assessment areas
that is not strictly branch-based and expansion of CRA coverage to include lenders that currently
dominate the mortgage lending market these suggestions are discussed in the section VI.
Technological Advancement and Break down of Financial Barriers Leading to Large
Financial Institutions. In the previous discussion of the weakening link between branch-based
deposit gathering and community lending, we saw that one of the rationales for requiring
depositories to serve the credit needs of the community was that these local depositories had
enjoyed a near monopoly in terms of attracting deposits and making loans. As the importance of
deposits as the primary source of mortgage capital was diminishing, the monopoly nature of
local banks was also changing. Technological advancement accelerated the pace of this change.
With the advent of sophisticated computing power, database management capability and superior
information technology, physical distance between lender and the consumer is no longer a
significant barrier in providing banking services. Online banking, ATMs, bankcards, and
electronic commerce have begun to fulfill most banking needs including banking services,
mortgages and investments. Consequently, competition from non-local and out-of-state banks
became fierce.
Banking legislation responded to this changing trend and relaxed the interstate branching
restrictions by passing Reigle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act in 1994. In
conjunction with interstate branching, common ownership of traditional banks and other nonbank institutions such as insurance companies, investment and financial companies, mutual
funds, pension funds have became a reality with the passage of Financial Modernization Act
(FMA) in 199927. One consequence of relaxing the interstate branching restriction and the
removal of financial barrier to participation by other types of financial institutions was the
27

Implications of the Reigle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act of 1994 and of Financial
Modernization Act of 1999 are discussed in Section V.
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emergence of large-scale, universal financial institutions. These large institutions were able to
afford superior technologies with high fixed cost, but very low marginal cost. These institutions
could then offer banking services to more people at less cost. Consequently, smaller, local banks
faced increased competition. Although many smaller continue to thrive in today’s banking
environment, others have lost their market share to large, distant lenders and many have merged
with or acquired by larger institutions, giving rise to even larger financial giants.
Growing Importance of Securitization and Expanding Shares of Loans Originated through
Mortgage Banking Operations The emergence of non-depository lenders like mortgage
bankers to capture the dominant position in mortgage origination has been possible because of
the growth of securitization of mortgages. Securitization has reduced the need for these nondepository lenders to hold deposits to fund mortgages. Standardization of loan contracts through
streamlined documents, uniform underwriting standards and standard risk assessment criteria has
contributed to this securitization process. Government-sponsored enterprises (GSEs) like, Fannie
Mae and Freddie Mac and other private conduits package mortgages into Mortgage Backed
Securities (MBS) and sell these securities to third party investors in the secondary market. The
majority of conventional, conforming28 loans are sold to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac. Nonconforming loans are pooled and sold by the investment bankers as private securities. Ginnie
Mae, the other GSE, does not purchase loans, but guarantees the timely payment of principal and
interest for privately issued securities backed by FHA-insured and VA-guaranteed loans. The
federal government’s involvement in the securitization and guarantee of payments in case of
default not only diminished the need for deposits to fund mortgage and allowed non-depository
lenders to capture mortgage origination market, but also provided a massive inflow of capital
into the housing market. Consequently, securitization has contributed to the availability and
affordability of mortgage credit to homebuyers.
The securitization and consequent inflow of credit to mortgage borrowers, including LMI
borrowers has significant implications for CRA lending. Increased securitization of CRAcovered lending has facilitated increased community lending. Although the trend to
securitization has largely affected the market for prime mortgages, efforts have been made to
securitize subprime, and CRA covered loans, which imposes greater challenge. “Because of the
lower down payments, flexible underwriting standards and lack of mortgage insurance on typical
28

Loans that meet GSE imposed terms and standards including maximum loan to value ratio, monthly debt to
income ratio and loan size limitations such that these loans are eligible for GSE purchase
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‘CRA loans,’ traditionally they have not been saleable in the mainstream secondary market
[Haag 2000].” Despite these challenge, securitization of CRA lending had been realized. In
1997, First Union Corporation securitized 384 million worth of mortgage loans originated by
First Union’s CRA program. By selling CRA assets, depository institutions can free up part of
their balance sheets for more community lending. Mainstream secondary market may play a
significant role in serving the LMI housing and community development needs, and thus further
the purpose of CRA.
CRA revision in 1995 has created investment test as a component of CRA evaluation for large
retail institutions. In that, lenders may receive CRA credit for purchasing CRA securities or
investing in the Community Development Financial Institutions (CDFI) that invest in community
developments. The federal government has also sought to create a secondary market for LMI
loans through other legislation. The Federal Housing Enterprise Financial Safety and Soundness
Act required HUD to set annual affordable loan-purchase targets for Fannie Mae and Freddie
Mac. Despite growing market for securitization and its implication for CRA, the most significant
developments in the financial market that have directly affected CRA are the growth of non-bank
lender and removal of financial barriers. As Hagg [2000] puts, “Two principal alterations in the
financial marketplace may limit the reach and effectiveness of the CRA regime. First, the
proliferation of non-branch delivery systems for banking products and services such as internet
banks, e-commerce, the U.S. mail, and the telephone, have challenged the definition of the
‘community’ to be served for purpose of CRA compliance. Second, the combination of interest
rate and other banking deregulation, increased competition in the financial services industry, and
technological innovation has resulted in a shift of financial assets out of depository institutions
that are subject to the CRA’s mandate and into non-bank financial services providers such as
insurance companies, mutual funds, pension funds and finance companies.”

V. Reforms and Modernization of CRA
In this section, I will trace out the major reforms of CRA since its inception and analyze some of
the underlying causes and implications of these reforms. CRA is a simple, short and general
statute. With a little involvement from the government, the act brought community residents and
the depository institutions into an atmosphere in which they can negotiate and pursue their selfinterests. Due to this simplistic nature of the act, however, it received an intense criticism, strong
comments and numerous questions seeking clarifying interpretations. In response to these
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criticisms, questions, and comments, the regulators have issued clarifying statements and
interpretive guidance. The simplicity and general nature of CRA and subsequent dynamic
process of questions and answers have made CRA one of the most flexible and adaptive acts that
survived the test of time and remained relevant for last quarter century.
Background of Past Reforms
In the first decade since the passage of CRA in 1978, the act remained largely dormant. The
strongest CRA enforcement provision - the ability of regulators to condition or deny merger
applications of lenders with poor CRA performance - was rarely used. The decade with a few
number of mergers in the banking sector explained, in part, why CRA enforcement provisions
were implemented so infrequently. In addition to lack of consolidations, limited lenders’
accountability might have influenced lax enforcement. Under original CRA provisions, lenders’
accountability for CRA performance was limited because performance was evaluated based on
the documentation of plans or proposed strategy as opposed to actual outcome of these plans.
Furthermore, in its first decade, CRA ratings and evaluations were not disclosed to the public.
Due to this limited disclosure, lenders might not have worried about the damage to reputation for
poor CRA performance. Limited disclosure might have also limited the effective participation of
community groups in the CRA examination process.
From this dormant status, CRA had emerged as a vibrant and influential act after its first decade.
Several independent events accelerated the modernization of CRA. One such event was the
failure and subsequent bailout of savings and loan associations in the late 1980. This bailout
required federal regulators to exert stricter supervision over depository institutions. Around the
same time, Pulitzer prize-winning ‘Color of Money’ series [Dedman 1988] in the Atlanta Journal
and Constitution documented the widespread racial disparities in mortgage lending in Atlanta.
Although CRA does not have a direct racial component, increased awareness of the race-based
discrimination in mortgage credit market helped establish the link between the CRA and racial
discrimination. “This (race-based disparity in mortgage lending) not only stimulated discussion
of the failure of banks to serve ‘community needs,’ but also linked CRA and Fair Lending in the
public debate [Ford Foundation 2002].”
A simple link between CRA and Fair Lending laws lies in the positive correlation between lowincome population and racial minority status. By requiring lenders to meet the credit needs of the
entire community including LMI neighborhoods and borrowers, CRA might help mitigate the
racial disparity of mortgage credit. For a detail methodological discussion of fair lending laws,
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tests for discrimination in mortgage lending and enforcement of fair lending regulation see Ross
and Yinger [2002], and Yezer [1994]. Given the positive correlation between low-income and
minority status, increased awareness of racial discrimination in mortgage credit focused new
light on CRA as another potential tool to strengthen fair lending legislation. Therefore,
researchers believe that the combination of “public reports of lax enforcement, compelling
evidence of lending discrimination in major cities and multibillion dollar taxpayer bailout of the
savings and loan industry all contributed to grassroots support for a stronger community
reinvestment movement. [William, McConnell and Nesiba 2001]”
Past Revisions to CRA
CRA has undergone several reforms in its twenty-five years’ of history. A few of these reform
efforts were substantial and elaborate, focusing exclusively on CRA such as, 1989 and 1993
CRA reforms. While some modifications affecting CRA were made as part of other legislations
that had a LMI lending components in it such as, 1991 amendment to the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation Improvement act, 1992 amendments to the Housing and Community
Development Act and sunshine provisions of Gramm-Leach-Bliely (GLB) Act. In a
chronological manner, these major reforms and amendments are discussed in this section.
Following table shows these revisions and the salient features of these revisions.
Table 5: Past CRA Reforms
Revision
1989 Revision in Financial Institution
Reform, Recovery and Enforcement
Act (FIRREA)

Salient Feature of the Revision
Descriptive rating system
Disclosure of performance
Emphasis on performance over promise

1991 Amendment to the Federal
Deposit Insurance Corporation
Improvement Act (FDICIA)
1992 Amendment to the Housing
and Community Development Act
1994 Amendment to the Riegle-Neal
Interstate Banking and Branching
Efficiency Act
1994 Department of Justice opinion on
direct enforcement mechanism
1995 Modernization to CRA

Discussion about the accuracy and
adequacy of the data used in the evaluation
Incentives to cooperate with minority- and
women-owned financial institutions
Separate rating and written evaluation for each
State
Direct enforcement actions for poor CRA
performance is beyond the scope of the law
Emphasis on performance over process
Lender-specific evaluation
Specification of performance context
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Specification of tests
Performance rating matrix
Data collection and reporting requirement
Revised definition of assessment area
1999 Amendment to the
Financial Modernization Act (FMA) or
Gramm-Leach-Bliely (GLB) act

Less frequent evaluation for better CRA
Performance
Disclosure of CRA agreements

1989 Revision
The first major revision of CRA took place in 1989, a decade after its initial passage. The
revision was known as Financial Institution Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act
(FIRREA)29. This revision brought about changes in the performance rating system, enhanced
focus on performance and introduced disclosure provisions. Some salient features of the
FIRREA are described in the below:
Descriptive Rating Scale over Numeric Ratings: FIRREA changed the numerical CRA rating
system, and introduced a descriptive rating scale. This descriptive evaluation had four levels of
performance (outstanding, satisfactory, needs to improve and substantial noncompliance) that
replaced five-tiered numeric ratings, which were similar to the ratings given to institutions based
on safety and soundness. One of the reasons for this change was to differentiate and remove any
perceived connection between CRA rating and previously existing safety rating.
Disclosure of performance: The provisions under FIRREA required lenders to disclose their
CRA ratings to the public. In addition to the disclosure of composite ratings, the act required
disclosure of a written statement of performance evaluation. The performance evaluation, under
the revised act, had two sections: public and confidential. The public section would contain
statements describing the basis of the rating for each of the twelve assessment factors. For wider
availability of the evaluation and ease of administration on the part of the lenders, the act
required lenders to place the public portion of performance evaluation in their CRA public file at
the head office and at one of the designated office in each local community.
The disclosure of rating and its basis was intended to have several implications. On one hand, the
disclosure provides community individuals and groups with more information about the ratings
allowing them to participate in CRA process more effectively. On the other hand, requiring
29

Detail of this revision is set forth at 12 CFR part 228 for FRB, 12 CFR part 345 for FDIC, 12 CFR part 25
for OCC and 12 CFR part 563e for OTS.
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examiners to describe how a particular rating is derived makes the examination process more
transparent. It allows lenders and community groups to evaluate the rationale and consistency of
the examination. This added requirement may have made the bank examiners more accountable
to the lenders as well as to the public. As report of the General Accounting Office (GAO) states,
“Public disclosure of CRA ratings has also made the regulators more accountable by allowing
interested members to the public to see how the regulators were rating various institutions [GAO
1995].”
Performance over Promise: Banking regulators emphasized CRA policy stating that lenders
would be evaluated based on their actual performance record at the time of examination, and not
merely on promises for improvements of their existing record in the future. On this ground in
1989, FRB for the first time denied the merger application of the Continental Bank Corporation
to acquire Grand Canyon Bank of Scottsdale. In their decision, FRB ruled, “in light of inaccurate
filings, and lack of significant efforts to ascertain the credit needs of its community or advertise
its products, with no compensating activities, the Bank’s commitments to improve CRA
performance did not absolve it for a weak CRA record [Ford Foundation 2002].” This decision
of FRB might have affected major policy shifts relating to how CRA evaluations are conducted
in the subsequent years. In 1995 CRA modernization, we find that not only the ‘promise to
perform’ has no effect on CRA evaluation, but also the ‘plans or strategy to perform’ has no
effect on CRA evaluation and whole evaluation is based on the ‘actual performance’. This
performance-based evaluation might have began to take shape in the early 1990’s.
1991 amendment
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA): This amendment
required regulators to discuss and comment in the public portion of the CRA evaluation about
the accuracy and adequacy of data used in the assessment of institutions’ CRA performance.
Accuracy of data may play a crucial role in the evaluation process and needs to be discussed,
adequately qualified and accounted for as much as possible. For example, GAO report [GAO
1995] states that in a survey conducted by Federal Reserve District Banks from 1993 to 1994
shows that the most significant errors found in the HMDA data during that period were
associated with the reported income of the loan applicant. While over half of these errors were
the result of banks reporting income figures from unverified application information, the other
half consisted of clerical errors of the reporting institutions. Since income information is the
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most important piece of information that often determines whether a loan is qualified for CRA
credit,30 errors in the income information may produce misleading CRA assessment.
The FDICIA amendment requiring a discussion of data limitation in the CRA evaluation
remained relevant long after its passage. FFIEC report on the nationwide summary statistics for
1996 CRA data shows that while reporting the location of small business or small farm loans,
borrowers report the census tract of the business or the farm, although the funds may be used to
support business activities or offices in another location. Allocation of funds to support activities
in a location with different characteristics than the characteristics of location originally reported
may provide misleading CRA assessment and may substantially undermine the purpose of CRA.
Another instance of misleading assessment caused by inadequate data occurs when business or
farmers receiving loans do no provide lending institutions with the street address of their
business or farm, rather provide only the post office address where correspondence should be
sent. When these loans are geocoded by the lender according to the census tract of the post office
as opposed to the census tract of the business or farm, it creates two problems. First, the data
shows extraordinary volume of loans in the census tracts with post offices and second,
characteristics of the census tracts with post offices may differ from those where the business or
farm is located causing misleading CRA assessments. By requiring a discussion about the
limitation on data in the CRA evaluation, FDICIA amendment forces the examiners to account
for data related distortions. This amendment was intended to encourage lenders to collect more
detailed and specific information about the loan and borrowers characteristics.
1992 amendment
Housing and Community Development Act: changes brought forward by this amendment
provided incentives to lending institutions for cooperating with minority- and women-owned
financial institutions and credit unions. The act required the regulators to consider the activities
and investments of minority- and women-owned institutions and low-income credit unions in
assessing the CRA performance of the lenders who cooperate with these institutions. In other
words, the act allowed regulators to grant CRA credits to the lenders that cooperate with certain
community lenders or financial institutions. Although this amendment is not a direct
modification to CRA, it tends to exploit CRA enforcement mechanism to create incentives for
30

Generally, loans made to the LMI borrowers, or in the LMI neighborhoods within the assessment area qualify
for CRA credits. Additionally, CRA examination considers loans, investments and services that have ‘community
development’ as their primary purpose. For definition of community development as provided in the 12 C.F.R. §
25.11(h) - (i), see the endnote.
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depository lenders to engage in activities that might promote community lending. Whether this
incentive has a real effect in addressing the community credit needs is a matter of further
investigation, but the use of CRA mechanisms to create such incentives might have adverse
effects. In that, CRA might lose its original focus and become a compendium of activities that
might promote community lending. For example, there is no evidence that cooperation with
minority- and women-owned as indicated in the Housing and Community Development Act
necessarily encourage these lender to help meet the credit needs of the entire community.
Additionally, this might make CRA performance assessment more complex and difficult for the
examiners.
1994 amendment
Riegle-Neal Interstate Banking and Branching Efficiency Act: Riegle-Neal interstate banking
and branching efficiency act allowed lenders to operate in a multi-state basis. This act responded
to the trends of the banking industry and enhanced efficiency of banking institutions by
providing flexibility, economies of scale and scope for larger banks. CRA provision of this act
requires that institutions with interstate branching structure to receive a separate rating and
written evaluation for each state in which they operate. In addition, the act requires that the bank
receive a written evaluation of their performance within a multi-state metropolitan area.
This increased flexibility and liberalization, however, has implications for CRA as described in
the previous section on the changing trends of the lending industry. Amendment concerning
CRA as proposed by this act addresses a specific issue with regards to CRA ratings in the era of
interstate banking. Specifically, the ability to operate in multi-state basis could allow lenders to
perform poorly in certain assessment area but extraordinarily in others to compensate the poor
performance. Requiring rating and evaluation for each state encourages lenders to perform well
in every state it operates.
The trend toward interstate operation in the financial industry has significant implications for
CRA. As interstate branching and distance lending become more common, rationale for branchbased deposit to finance investments becomes even weaker. In addition to this weakening effect,
the emergence of very large financial institutions has other implications on the effectiveness of
CRA. Financial assets holdings of depository institutions dropped from 40 percent to 22 percent
of country’s total financial intermediary assets from 1977 to 1995 [Litan 1997 as reported in
Haag 2000]. Since the total assets of the financial intermediaries have risen in this period, one
possible explanation for the reduction of financial assets of the depositories may be the
51

substitution of assets from depository institutions to non-depositories or relative reduction of size
of the depositories as compared to non-depositories. The substitution of assets was most likely to
occur in the large-sized financial organizations that could own both depository and nondepository institutions under the new banking laws. The other possibility for the reduction of
asset could be the absolute reduction of the number of depositories. Indeed, the number of
commercial banks and savings associations has dropped more than 40 percent during period
between 1975 and 1997 [Avery et. al. 1999]. This reduction of the number of depositories may
be attributable to the massive scale consolidations also fostered by new banking legislation. With
the reduction of the asset size and of the number of depositories – the major component of CRAcovered institutions - the number of loans made these institutions has also fallen. “From 1993 to
2000, the number of home purchase loans made by CRA-regulated institution in their assessment
area as a share of all home purchase loan fell from 36.1 percent to 29.5 percent [Ford Foundation
2002].” As assets, size and financial base of CRA-covered institutions falls, the effectiveness of
the act in terms of its ability to increase LMI lending, investment and its geographic scope will
likely to decline.
The break down of financial barriers and the emergence of financial institutions with large size
and wider scope allow lenders to perform multiple activities that have been proscribed before.
The most important advantage of deregulation and consequent large-scale institutions is the
economies of scale that reduces the average cost of delivering financial services. Some
researchers believe, "In reality, deregulation and new technologies have promoted competition
and precipitated a great broadening of the credit market [Gunther 2000].” Many others argue that
consolidations result in increased efficiency, safety and liquidity to banks that belong to larger
and diversified organization, which would contribute to increased credit availability for small
business and LMI communities [see Keeton 1997]. Some of these researchers go even further to
claim that recent increase in lending to LMI neighborhoods is almost exclusively attributable to
the break down of barriers than due to the regulations like CRA. “Economic theory and empirical
evidence both indicate the reason for the recent growth in lending to low-income neighborhoods
is not the CRA but the effectiveness of market forces in breaking down the types of financial
barriers prevalent when the CRA was enacted [Gunther 2000]."
Opinion of Department of Justice: In 1993, initial reform proposal of CRA sought to
strengthen enforcement by calling for regulators to use existing formal enforcement actions set
forth in the banking laws, such as cease-and desist orders and civil money penalties. In
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December 1994, Department of Justice determined that regulators lack authority to use any direct
enforcement mechanism for poor CRA performance other than measures taken in the context of
an application. Although this opinion disappointed the proponents of CRA including several
members of the Congress and community activists, it clearly outlined the extent of enforcement
authority available to the regulators. This opinion implied that the original statute permitted an
indirect enforcement for CRA and any stronger enforcement, such as direct monetary penalty or
cease and desist order would require actions of the legislative body.
1995 Modernization
In 1993, regulators initiated a major initiative to reform CRA regulations. The goal of the reform
was to “develop revised rules that would clarify how we (the regulators) would evaluate the
performance of the institution we supervise. It also was our goal to develop a new system of
evaluating financial institutions’ records with respect to CRA that would focus primarily on
objective, performance-based assessment standards that minimizes compliance burden while
stimulating improved performance. [66 Federal Register 37602].” After seven public hearings
and two proposed rules, the joint final rules came out on May 4, 1995 [60 Federal Register
22156].
The 1995 regulations were to phase in by July 1, 1997. At that time, all provision of the revised
regulations would be applicable to all financial institutions covered under CRA and the 1978
regulations would fully expire31. Since the 1995 joint final rules, regulators have issued two
clarifying amendments [60 Federal Register 66048 (1995) and 61 Federal Register 21362
(1996)]. In addition, FFIEC has published guidance to agency staff in the form of Interagency
Question and Answers (Interagency Q&A) regarding community reinvestment under the new
regulations [61 FR 54647]. This guidance was an attempt to create a comprehensive document
regarding guidance on revised CRA regulations that would serve as informal staff guidance for
financial institutions, agency staffs and the public32. The major features of 1995 final reform can
be summarized under the following headings:

31

Since the full implementation of revised regulations, the FFIEC found that the guidelines and policy statements
issued to interpret the 1978 regulations have become obsolete. Consequently, the FFIEC withdrew the 1989
Policy Statement [54 FR 13742], 1990 Rating Guidelines [55 FR 18163] and the 1991 Lending Analysis Policy
Statement [December 6, 1991].
32
On October 7, 1997 the FFIEC supplemented, amended, and republished the Interagency Q&A to provide
further assistance about the final rule. In 2000, FFIEC published another interpretive guidance in the form of
questions and answers [65 Federal Register 25088] interpreting the CRA regulations.
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Performance Over Process: The goal of 1995 modernization was to develop a new method for
evaluating financial institutions’ record with respect to CRA that would focus primarily on
objective, performance-based assessment standards. Under the regulations, the regulators would
conduct a performance-based examination in which actual performance in serving the needs and
convenience of the local community counts, and the efforts exerted (strategy, manpower and
paper work) to achieve the performance is not accounted for.
Performance based evaluation marked a new beginning of CRA enforcement. It proposes a major
shift from the previous evaluation methods. Basically, performance based evaluation proposes
that regulators will not focus how lenders conduct or choose their CRA activities as long as these
activities brings result – meets the credit needs of the entire community. This new way to
evaluate the CRA performance is simple, objective and straightforward. It also reduces the need
for examiners’ judgment to a certain degree in evaluating the effectiveness of varied community
lending activities and strategies a lender might choose. Since the lenders are not required to
document and prove their community lending efforts, this method also reduces paper work
burden for lenders in a substantial way.
In addition, I believe this evaluation method has a similarity with the concepts of ‘procedural
equity’ versus ‘equity in outcome’33. The emphasis on performance-based evaluation can be
thought of as a shift of emphasis from procedural equity to equity in outcome. In that, it is not
sufficient for lenders to prove elaborate community lending efforts directed towards borrowers in
the community, but an evenhanded distribution of loans across LMI and non-LMI areas and
borrowers after allowing for credit needs of the community, considering capacity, safety and
performance context of the lenders would give CRA credit to lenders.
Lender-Specific Evaluation: Under the new regulations, the scope of the CRA examination of
financial institutions is determined by the institution’s size and business strategy. For the purpose
of evaluation, agencies have determined two sizes of institutions: small and large. With respect
to diverging business strategy, regulators have divided the lending institutions into two types:
‘Retail institutions’ and ‘Wholesale or limited purpose institutions’. Combining different sizes
and types of institutions, regulators have devised three different types of evaluations. They are:
evaluation for large retail institutions, streamline evaluation for small retail institutions and
33

The procedural equity and equity in outcome are concepts often used in discrimination and affirmative action
literature. The procedural equity requires that everyone, including the minority, must be treated using same
standards. While equity in outcome states that when historical discrimination and unequal treatments had persisted
in the past, procedural equity is not enough to achieve equity in outcome. Society might need to allow a favorable
treatment to minority to achieve equity outcome.
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evaluation for limited purpose and wholesale institutions.34 In addition, to allow for greater
flexibility to account for the unique strategic circumstance of lending institutions, regulations
also provide an alternative option for any institution to be examined against a strategic plan. This
plan consists of a set of objective, measurable goals established by the bank, utilizing the inputs
from its community, and approved by the institution’s regulator.
The lender-specific evaluation addresses some of the issues raised in the reactions of lending
institutions (section III). In that, it was argued that CRA examination did not take the specialized
nature of lenders into account. One examination for all institutions had been criticized to be
unfair and inefficient. In addition to addressing this criticism, clear guidance regarding lenderspecific evaluation reduced the examiner’s judgment in the evaluation process. Examiner’s
judgment may have produced different CRA ratings for lenders with comparable community
lending performance. Reducing the scope of this judgment was one of the major goals of revised
CRA regulations.
Specification of Performance Context: Regardless of which evaluation method is used, every
institution’s CRA performance is evaluated within a “performance context”. The performance
context explicitly takes into account the unique characteristics of the institution under
examination and the characteristics and needs of the community in which it operates. The tests
and standards set out in the CRA examination are applied against the following six contexts:
1. The economic and demographic characteristics of the assessment areas
2. Lending, investment and service opportunities in the assessment areas
3. The institution’s product offerings and business strategy
4. The institution’s capacity and constraints
5. The prior performance of the institution
6. Information contained in the institution’s public CRA file, including written public
comments.
To determine the performance context, the regulators may request information on lending,
investment and service opportunities in the institution’s assessment area that the institution
would normally gather to develop its business plan or to identify potential markets and
customers. In addition to the information obtained from the institution, the regulators may

34

Apparently, no distinction was made between small and large ‘wholesale institutions and limited purpose’.
Consequently, one evaluation was applicable for all sizes of limited purpose and wholesale institutions.
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consider information from other sources including community, government, civic, and other
sources.
Explicit recognition of performance context requires examiners to conduct a lender specific test
that goes beyond the consideration of lender’s size (small or large) and type (retail or wholesale
and limited purpose). Performance context also clearly identifies the factors that the examiners
should consider to account for the uniqueness of the institution and its market. This explicitness
was intended to reduce subjective judgment on the part of the examiners who would use widely
varied factors in evaluating the particular context of each institution.
Specification of Tests: Each of the three types of evaluation has its own test that reflect different
ways lending institutions can fulfill their community reinvestment obligations. According to final
rule, large retail institutions are evaluated under three separate tests: lending, investment and
service test, small institutions are evaluated under the streamlined small institution test and
wholesale and limited purpose institutions are evaluated under the community development test.
In addition to three types of evaluations, regardless of size and types, all institutions have the
option to be evaluated under a pre-approved strategic plan. In the following section, I will
discuss significant features of these tests.
Lending Test: The lending test is the most heavily weighted component of CRA examination
for large retail institutions carrying at least one half of the performance ratings35. This test is
designed to measure a lender’s record of helping to meet the credit needs of its assessment area
through home mortgage, small business, small farm and community development lending36. The
regulation provides five performance criteria and seven factors37 considered under lending test.
The performance criteria for lending test are:
1. Lending activity: including the number and amount of loans in the bank’s assessment
area.

35

Detail weight distribution in the CRA performance rating is discussed later in this section also see table 2.
If lenders want their regulator to evaluate their consumer lending (auto loans, personal loans) record, they may
elect to do so by providing consumer-lending data in a specific format. Whenever consumer lending constitutes a
substantial portion of lenders’ business, the regulators are required to consider those lending whether or not
lenders elect to provide consumer-lending data.
37
Performance criteria and factors under lending, investment and service test are listed in a table at the endnote.
36
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2. Geographic distribution: including the proportion of loans in the assessment area and
distribution of loans in low-, moderate-, middle- and upper-income38 geographies in
the assessment area.
3. Borrower characteristics: including the proportion of loans across low-, moderate-,
middle- and upper-income borrowers in the assessment area, and the number and
amount of loans to small business and small farm.
4. Community development (CD) lending: including the number and amount of
community development loans and their complexity and innovativeness. Lenders can
elect to have their regulators consider CRA-qualified community development
lending by their affiliates under certain guidance. This guidance in terms of types of
CD lending that are qualified, data that needs to be collected, maintained and reported
and other restrictions on the affiliate lending are discussed later in this section under
‘Data Collection and Reporting Requirement’.
5. Use of innovative or flexible lending practices: including use of innovative or flexible
lending practices to address credit needs of LMI borrowers and neighborhoods.
Investment Test: This test is designed to evaluate lenders’ record of meeting the credit needs of
their community through qualified investments39 that benefits their assessment area or a broader
statewide or regional area that includes the lenders’ assessment area. In evaluating investment
test, regulations specifies four performance criteria:
1. Number and amount of qualified investment.
2. Innovativeness and complexity of qualified investment.
3. Needs for the qualified investment or degree to which these types of investments not
routinely provided by other private investors.
4. Responsiveness of qualified investments to credit and community development needs.

38

Middle-income geographies include census tracts with more than 80 percent but less than 120 percent of the
MSA median income. Upper income geographies include census tract with more than 120 percent of the MSA
median income.
39
A qualified investment has as its primary purpose community development. Some examples of this investment
may include an investment, deposit, membership share, or grants in or to:
- Financial intermediaries such as CDFIs or CDCs,
- Organizations engaged in affordable housing rehabilitation or construction,
- Small business investment companies (SBICs),
- Projects eligible for low-income housing tax credits,
- State and municipal obligations, or
- A nonprofit organization serving community development needs such as homeownership counseling and other
financial service education.
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Although these performance criteria tend to specify the factors upon which the regulators would
carry out investment test, these criteria hardly remove examiners’ subjective judgment associated
with the test. There is no clear, objective means to evaluate and compare the innovativeness or
responsiveness of different qualified investments. “An area for further review is the definition of
‘innovative.’ Some lender contend that regulators are slow to consider ‘innovations that are
actually challenging to accomplish [Ford Foundation 2002].” Moreover, some institutions may
not be in a position to engage in any investment at all, but are likely to receive some investment
credits anyway. As GAO [1995] study points out, “Institutions with limited investment authority,
such as thrifts, are to receive a low-satisfactory rating under the investment test, even if they
have made few or no qualified investments, as long as they have a strong lending records.” In a
study using internal evaluation of OTS, the Office of Inspector General, U.S. Department of
Treasury was unable to validate the appropriateness of the investment test ratings for 41% of its
sample [Department of Treasure as reported in Thomas 2003]. This allocation of CRA credit
may contribute to grade inflation. Additionally, since community development (CD) loans are
evaluated under the lending test and these loans form the basis for the investment test as well,
some researchers suggests the need for more specific guidelines about the distinction between
these two (Thomas 1998).
Experience with the investment test and its effectiveness in utilizing CRA legislation to tap into
diversified capital market has been mixed. Development of a secondary market in CRA
securities, prompted by new emphasis on CRA qualified40 investment activities has been
considered as an important tool for increasing the lending capital of lending institutions.
Allocation of CRA credit for third party intermediary lending and qualified investments in the
revised regulations has provided incentive for lenders to pool their resources in various multibank lending arrangements such as loan consortia41. These institutional arrangements have been
used increasingly in recent years because they appear to offer an effective means to reduce
transactions cost in lending process by sharing informational benefits, exploiting economies
scale and spreading credit risk within a limited geographic area to number of institutions (Haag
2000, Avery et. al. 1997, GAO 1995, Calem and Wachter 1998 and Mendez 1998).
40

CRA qualified or CRA eligible loan includes loans to borrowers earning less than 80 percent of area median
income and/or loan made on properties in census tracts with incomes less than 80 percent of the Metropolitan
Statistical Area (MSA) median income as of the last census.
41
Loan consortia generally consist of lending institutions often located within spatial proximity and share
common assessment area that pool lending funds and collect equity stakes for LMI lending and community
development.
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Other researchers recognize the benefit of lending consortia and associated information
externalities. However, they contend that increased emphasis on investment test may have
adversely affected the original objective of CRA. Independent investment and service test shift
one half of the weight away from the lending test, which is the original focus of CRA. In
addition, the investment test may have produced several unintended distortions in the credit
markets. For example, the primary barrier cited by financial institutions in meeting the
investment test under CRA is the limited number of qualified CRA investment opportunities
within the financial institutions’ assessment area(s) [Summary Report 2001]. Due to limited
supply of qualified investments but increased demand by lending institutions to fulfill CRA
requirements, qualified investments carry a premium which can be as much as one full point.
This premium might have induced Wall Street opportunists to exploit CRA ‘gold mine’ that has
nothing to do with LMI credit. “The current investment test has led to many qualified
investments that merely recycle existing loans with no new underlying LMI loans being created.
One loan may be bought and sold many times and then securitized and then securitized and
repeatedly traded as an LMI MBS. Since it is defined as a qualified CRA investment, many
banks get CRA credit for but one underlying LMI loan42 (Thomas 2003).” Indeed, interviews
with several national lenders in the Ford Foundation study reveal “this practice, by which the
loans pass through the hands of an additional owner on their way to the secondary market, is
clearly uneconomic. Lenders appear to treat it as a cost of doing business and one that is
preferable to risking a rating below satisfactory that hurts their competitive standing [Ford
Foundation 2002].”
In addition to these arguments43 indicating adverse impact of the investment test on the overall
effectiveness of CRA, investment test has important difference as compared to other two tests. In
that, investment test does not provide a lender-specific benchmark to measure the degree of
compliance with CRA requirements. In a lending or service test, the regulators are able to

42

Although CRA regulations impose a general restriction on the number of times a loan can be bought and sold
between affiliates, under current regulations an examiner has no means to know the transaction history of
underlying loans within a mortgage based CRA securities.
43
These arguments can be summarized as follows:
a. Lack of definition for innovativeness and complexity of investment.
b. Reliance on the subjective judgment of the examiner.
c. Not suitable for all large institutions to undertake such investment activities.
d. Possible source of profiteering off CRA legislation.
e. Possible source of CRA grade inflation.
f. Lack of benchmark for measuring the degree of compliance.
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examine the lending or service activities44 of a particular lender across LMI and non-LMI
neighborhoods and population without having to perform a across-lender comparison to evaluate
the degree of compliance. The examiner can also acquire a sense of the community needs by
looking at the demand for credits or services in the community. On the contrary, for the
investment test regulators may be required to look at the across-lender investments in the
community to measure the performance of any individual lender. This is because investments in
affordable housing, into projects eligible for low-income housing tax credits or grants to local
CDFI are essentially directed towards LMI communities and individuals, and therefore lenderspecific analysis that looks at the extent and effectiveness of LMI versus non-LMI investments is
not applicable. The difficulty in across-lender analysis, however, is that not all lenders are able or
choose to participate in investment activities to comply with CRA.
Under these circumstances, many researchers including some members of lending institutions
believe that investment test under CRA should be optional or abolished. “Many large banks and
virtually every bank trade association are rightfully asking that CRA be returned to its LMI
lending roots by abolishing the investment test [Thomas 2003].” Most CRA activists, community
groups and advocates, however, are not willing to lessen the regulatory scopes of CRA. Many
researchers believe that community groups’ attitude to rigidly adhere to the existing provisions
and to add only the new requirements are unproductive.
Service Test: The service test constitutes one quarter of the entire weight of the CRA
examination for large retail institutions. The service test evaluates a bank's record of helping to
meet the credit needs of its assessment area(s) by analyzing both the availability and
effectiveness of a bank's systems for delivering retail banking services and the extent and
innovativeness of its community development services. Two components - (a) retail banking
services and (b) community development service45 of the service test account the degree to
which retail banking and community development services are tailored to meet the LMI
geographies.
The performance criteria to evaluate the availability and effectiveness of a bank's systems for

44

Activities relating to service test are discussed in the next under ‘Service Test’.
Community development (CD) services are the services that benefit a bank's assessment area(s) or a broader
statewide or regional area that includes the bank's assessment area(s). By the CRA regulation, CD services must
be limited to financial in nature. For example, employee’s participation in the volunteer neighborhood-renovation
program may not be considered as CD service. However, lender’s financial assistance in the form of loans or
grants to renovate historic properties can be considered as CD service.
45
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delivering retail-banking services46 can be summarized as follows:
1. The current distribution of the bank's branches among low-, moderate-, middle-, and
upper-income geographies.
2. In the context of its current distribution of the bank's branches, the bank's record of
opening and closing branches, particularly branches located in low- or moderate-income
geographies or primarily serving low- or moderate-income individuals.
3. The availability and effectiveness of alternative systems for delivering retail banking
services (e.g., RSFs, RSFs not owned or operated by or exclusively for the bank, banking
by telephone or computer, loan production offices, and bank-at-work or bank-by-mail
programs) in low- and moderate-income geographies and to low- and moderate-income
individuals.
4. The range of other banking services provided in low-, moderate-, middle-, and upperincome geographies and the degree to which the services are tailored to meet the needs
of those geographies.
For the purposes of the service test, the extent and innovativeness of lending service may be
measured in several dimensions including access to traditional full-service branch operations and
alternative service-delivery mechanisms. The focus of the test, however, is “to be on the
institution’s current distribution of full-service branches. Alternative systems for delivering retail
banking services are to be considered only to the extent that they are effective alternatives in
providing needed services to LMI areas and individuals [GAO 1995].” With regards to service
test, some of the previously discussed complaints including lack of clarity about the amount of
service needed or must be provided, about the relative weights between retail service and
community development service, and about the measure of innovativeness can be raised. “By
most accounts, the service test component of the examination is the least well developed of the
three. Review of the CRA examinations for the banks interviewed for this study suggests that
regulators in general spend little time on this element of the examination [Apgar and Duda
2003].” Some community advocates suggest that growth of payday lenders and check cashers in
the community who provide similar service as depository lenders at a much higher price should
be indicative of lack of meeting the banking needs of the community and should adversely affect
the performance of CRA covered lenders.
46

The performance criteria to evaluate the community development services are:
1. The extent to which the bank provides community development services.
2. The innovativeness and responsiveness of community development services.
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Streamlined Test for Small Institutions: In order to provide certain regulatory relief to small
institutions [see endnote], a streamlined test was designed in the 1995 regulation. This
streamlined test reflects regulators’ desire to account for the differences in capacity to fulfill
CRA requirements that are associated with size. Most notably, small institutions are exempt for
data collection and reporting requirements of CRA. The streamlined test for the small lenders are
evaluated under the following performance criteria:
1. The bank's loan-to-deposit ratio, adjusted for seasonal variation and, as appropriate, other
lending-related activities, such as loan originations for sale to the secondary markets,
community development loans, or qualified investments.
2. The percentage of loans and, as appropriate, other lending-related activities located in the
bank's assessment area(s).
3. The bank's record of lending to and, as appropriate, engaging in other lending-related
activities for borrowers of different income levels and businesses and farms of different
sizes.
4. The geographic distribution of the bank's loans.
5. The bank's record of taking action, if warranted, in response to written complaints about its
performance in helping to meet credit needs in its assessment area(s).
The above criteria show that streamlined test focuses primarily on lending activities of the small
lenders with no separate tests for investment and service related activities. The loan-to-deposit
ratio is a simple and easily measurable quantitative criteria considered in the streamlined test.
This criterion reflects regulators’ desire for a simple and objective evaluation for streamlined
test.
Community Development Test for Wholesale and Limited Purpose Institutions: Although
wholesale and limited purpose institution47 fall under the coverage of CRA, due to their limited
product line and specialized customer base, their record of helping to meet the credit needs of
their assessment area(s) is evaluated under separate community development test. In order to
receive a designation as a wholesale or limited purpose bank, a bank must file a request, in
writing, prior to the proposed effective date of the designation. If the designation is approved, it
remains in effect until the bank requests revocation of the designation or until regulators revoke
the designation on their own initiative. Performance in the community development test is
47
Wholesale institutions are not in the business of making home mortgage, small business, small farm or
consumer loans to retail customers and limited purpose institutions offer a narrow product line such as credit card
banks.
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assessed through lender’s community development lending, qualified investments, or community
development services. Performance criteria for evaluating the community development test can
be summarized as below:
1. The number and amount of community development loans48, qualified investments, or
community development services.
2. The use of innovative or complex qualified investments, community development loans, or
community development services and the extent to which the investments are not routinely
provided by private investors.
3. The bank's responsiveness to credit and community development needs.
At lender's option, the regulators will consider its community development performance in
qualified investments or community development services provided by an affiliate of the lender, if
the investments or services are not claimed by any other institution. Community development
lending by affiliates, consortia and third parties may also be considered under certain rules49.
Under community development test, lender receives credit for community development loans,
qualified investments, and community development services that benefit areas within the lender's
assessment area(s) or a broader statewide or regional area that includes the lender's assessment
area(s). When these similar activities benefit areas outside the lender's assessment area(s), the
regulators will consider these activities only if the lender has adequately addressed the needs of
its assessment area(s).
Performance Ratings Matrix: The performance ratings matrix illustrates performance criteria
and factors within the lending, investment, service test for the large retail institutions, the
streamline test for the small institutions and within the community development test for the
wholesale and limited purpose institutions. For large retail institutions, examiners evaluate each
component of performance factors under lending, service and investment test and assign one of
the five ratings50 based on a judgment supported by facts and data. Performance ratings are
converted to numerical weight according to the table 6 given below. The table shows that better
48

Community development loans include originations, purchases and commitments of community development
loan by the bank. In case of loan commitments, bank must provide appropriate data on outstanding loans,
commitments, and letters of credit.
49
Rules and requirements for considering such loans are discussed under ‘Data Collection and Reporting
Requirement (elective data)’ subsection below.
50
The performance ratings are: outstanding, high satisfactory, low satisfactory, needs to improve an substantial
noncompliance. Although performance ratings under each test are used to obtain overall composite rating of the
institution, performance ratings are not same as composite rating. While performance rating has five possible
outcomes, composite ratings have four as shown in the table 6 and 7 respectively.
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performance rating in any given test carries higher numerical weight. In order to attach more
importance to lending test than service and investment test, numerical weight for any given
rating varies across tests. While lending test carries at least double weights than other two tests,
service and investment test are treated equally under revised CRA evaluation.
Table 6: Numerical Weights for Performance Ratings under Different Tests for Large
Retail Institutions
Performance Ratings
Lending
Service
Investment
Outstanding
12
6
6
High Satisfactory
9
4
4
Low Satisfactory
6
3
3
Needs to Improve
3
1
1
Substantial Noncompliance
0
0
0

To obtain the final composite rating for any given large institution, points obtained under all
three tests are added up and total points are converted into composite rating according to table 7
below. To provide further importance of the lending test two further rules are adhered. First,
Regardless of point values, no institution can receive a composite rating of “satisfactory” unless
it receives a minimum rating of “low-satisfactory” in the lending test. Second, an institution that
receives “outstanding” on the lending test is assured of a “satisfactory” composite rating, even if
it receives “substantial non-compliance” on both the investment and service tests.
Table 7: Distribution of Numerical Points for Composite Ratings
Rating
Outstanding
Satisfactory
Needs to Improve
Substantial Noncompliance

Total Points
20 or over
11 through 19
5 through 10
0 through 4

The matrix and explicit description of the factors may provide greater standardization and
uniformity in the evaluation process and may help reduce examiners’ judgment inherent in the
evaluation process. In addition, this matrix and tables to derive composite CRA ratings may
allow regulators to provide well-deserved importance of community lending in the examination
process by providing higher weights to the lending test.
Data Collection and Reporting Requirement: These requirements are introduced in the 1995
modernization to evaluate the performance of covered institutions in an objective fashion.
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According to the revised CRA regulation, all CRA-covered institutions that are not small [see
endnote for definition] or special-purpose institutions are subject to the data collection and
reporting requirement of CRA. Data that are collected, maintained and reported under CRA can
be divided into two broad groups: essential data and elective data.
Essential Data: This data types must be reported to appropriate regulators by all covered
institutions. Data that fall under this category are:
1. Community Development (CD) loans51
2. Small business loans52 and
3. Small farm loans53
4. Certain home mortgage loan data54
For community development (CD) loans, total number and dollar amount of originated or
purchased loans that benefit the covered institutions’55 assessment area(s) or a broader statewide
or regional area that includes the institution’s assessment area(s) are reported in aggregate form.
For reporting purposes, the level of aggregation is the census tract. In other word, total number
of tracts in the assessment area represents the number of records in the entire data submission.
For small business and small farm loans, large retail institutions are required to collect and
maintain information about loans originated and purchased by these institutions on a loan-byloan basis. This information includes loan amount, loan location, origination date and indicator
whether the loan was to a business or farm with gross annual revenues on $1 million or less. In
addition to maintenance and collection, these institutions are required to report number and
dollar amount of small business and small farm loans aggregated by the census tract in which the
lender has originated or purchased these loans.

51

A community development loan has community development as its primary purpose, where primary purpose
implies the loan is designed for the express purpose of community development. For further discussion of primary
purpose see interagency questions and answers 12(i) and 563e.12(h)-7. For the definition of community
development as provided in the CRA regulation see the endnote.
52
Small business loans are defined as those whose original amounts are $1 million or less and that were reported
on the institution’s Call Report or TFR as either “Loans secured by non-farm or nonresidential real estate” or
“Commercial or industrial loans.” Therefore, small business loans can be provided to businesses of any size as
long as the loan amount is less than $1 million. In other words, it is the loan size, but not the size of the borrowing
business or its gross revenue that determines small business loans.
53
Small farm loans are defined as those whose original amounts are $500,000 or less and that were reported as
either “Loans secured by farmland” or “Loans to finance agricultural production and other loans to farmers.”
54
This loan data is reported to supplement the Home Mortgage Disclosure Act (HMDA) data only for mortgage
loans to properties that are located outside the MSAs.
55
Since small institutions are exempt from the data-reporting requirement, covered institutions in this case would
imply large retail institutions and wholesale or limited purpose institutions.
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In order to understand how the essential data may help evaluation of institutions, we need to look
at different types of evaluations conducted by the examiners. As mentioned earlier, there are four
different types of evaluation methods for different types of institutions. These tests are: the
lending, investment and service test for large retail institutions; community development test for
wholesale or limited purpose institutions; streamlined performance test for small institutions;
and the test on strategic plan for institution with approved strategic plan. Since small institutions
are exempt from data collection and reporting requirements, for streamlined performance test
that are applicable for these institutions evaluation cannot rely on the reported data. For large
retail institutions, examiners consider essential and elective data when evaluating the lending test
or the test of strategic plan if the institutions are approved for the plan. For wholesale or limited
purpose institutions, community development (CD) loans reported under essential data are
considered when evaluating the community development test or test on strategic plan as
applicable for them.
Elective Data: CRA regulations allow lending institutions to report certain data at lenders’
discretion in order to improve their CRA performance. The primary purpose of this provision is
to provide incentive to lenders for engaging in activities that are not required under CRA. These
activities may have a positive impact in alleviating the credit needs of LMI borrowers or
community. For example, lenders may collect and present their MECA56 activities as “other loan
data” to examiners for consideration in the lending test.
Loans originated or purchased by an affiliate57 constitute another form of elective data. In order
for affiliate loans to be counted in the CRA examination, the loans must satisfy certain guidelines
with regards to its qualification as well as the methods of collection, maintenance and reporting
of those loans58. Generally, no affiliate may claim a loan origination or purchase if another
institution claims the same loan for origination or purchase. However, there are exceptions to this
general rule. For example, if an institution purchases a loan from its affiliate who originated the
loan in the first place then both the institution and its affiliate can count the same loan as
purchase and origination respectively provided the loan is not sold several times to inflate CRA

56

MECA stands for Modification, Extension and Consolidation Agreements. MECAs are transactions by which
an institution obtains loans from another institution without actually purchasing or refinancing the loans. Although
these transactions are not considered as purchase or refinance under CRA, they have positive effects on CRA
ratings.
57
An affiliate means any company that controls, is controlled by, or is under common control with another
company. The term “control” has the meaning defined in regulation 12 U.S.C. 1841(a)(2).
58
For detailed guidelines, refer to FFIEC’s ‘A Guide to CRA Data Collection and Reporting.’
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ratings. Another exception is allowed for multifamily affordable housing loans that may be
considered as a community development loan and home mortgage loan at the same time.
If an institution elects to have its regulators consider loans originated or purchased by its
affiliates for the purpose of the lending test59 or community development test60 or for a test on
approved strategic plan, the institution must collect, maintain and report those loan data as if it
had originated or purchased those loans by itself. In addition, institutions have the flexibility to
elect one or more category61 of their affiliate’s loans for consideration. However, if an institution
elects to have its regulator consider its affiliate’s loans within a particular lending category in the
institution’s assessment area(s), the institution must elect to consider all loans within that lending
category in that particular assessment area(s).
Under the revised regulation, lending institutions may elect to have their regulators consider
loans originated or purchased by a consortium or a third party institutions (such as a community
development bank or a community development corporation) in which these institutions
participate or invest. In order for these institutions to receive CRA credit, the institutions must
report aggregate number and dollar amount of consortium or third party loans. Credits for CRA
qualified consortium loans can be allocated in two possible ways. One of them is to divide the
consortium loans for CRA claim among its participants or investors in way that no loan is
claimed by more that one institution, and other is to claim a percentage share (based on the level
of participation or investment) of the total loans originated or purchased by the consortium or
third party.
Revised Definition of Assessment Area: The most closely scrutinized activities in the CRA
examination are lending, investment and service activities of lenders within their assessment
area. CRA performance outside the assessment area is not examined or graded very heavily.
Definition of ‘community’ or ‘assessment area’ therefore, can become a significant factor in
CRA assessment. This definition, however, has been revised over time. In the original
legislation, the assessment area or ‘delineated community’ was defined as reasonable delineation
of contiguous area surrounding each office or group of offices of the lender. Under the 1995
revision, the ‘assessment area’ of a retail institution would include the local areas around its
deposit taking facilities, including ATMs in which it has originated or purchased a substantial
59

In case a large retail institution.
In case of a wholesale or limited purpose institution.
61
The basic categories of loans are: (1) home mortgage loans (2) small business loans (3) small farm loans (4)
community development loans and (5) five sub categories of consumer loans [ a. motor vehicle loans b. credit
card loans c. home equity loans d. other secured loans and e. other unsecured loans].
60
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portion of its loans. This area must compose one or more MSA or contiguous political
subdivisions by including full census tracts and block numbering areas.
1999 Changes
Financial Modernization Act (FMA) of 1999: The FMA also known as Gramm-Leach-Bliley
Act (GLBA) is one of the most sweeping financial modernization acts in recent years. The act
repeals sections 20 and 32 of the Banking Act of 193362 that restricted depository institutions’
affiliation with securities firms. This act also modifies the Bank Holding Company Acts of 1956
and 1970 and creates a new "financial holding company" that would be able to engage in a list of
statutorily provided financial activities, including insurance, securities underwriting, agency
activities, merchant banking and insurance company portfolio investment activities. The FMA
includes several provisions relating to CRA. I discuss these provisions in some details in the
below.
Less Frequent Evaluation for Better CRA Performance the FMA provides certain regulatory
relief with regards to CRA examination to small lending institutions. According to this relief
provision, small banks and S&Ls that received an outstanding rating at their most recent CRA
exam shall not receive a routine CRA exam more often than once every 5 years. Small banks and
S&Ls that received a satisfactory rating at their most recent CRA exam shall not receive a
routine CRA exam more often than once every 4 years. FMA also ties modernization and
increased flexibility provided to financial institutions with CRA performance of these
institutions. The act requires that Federal Reserve may not permit a company to form a financial
holding company if any of its subsidiary banks or S&Ls did not receive at least a satisfactory
rating in its most recent CRA exam. A bank or financial holding company may not commence
new activities authorized under the Gramm-Leach Act if any bank or bank affiliates of a
financial holding company, received less than satisfactory rating at its most recent CRA exam.
The GLB provisions for small banks although provide substantial relief to these lenders,
proponents of CRA argue that by keeping a large percentage63 of lending institutions beyond
regulatory reach for five years may diminish the effectiveness of CRA by inducing these lenders
not to engage in LMI lending [see Thomas 2003]. The National Community Reinvestment
Coalition (NCRC) believes that with less frequent CRA examination, small banks will become
adept at gaming the CRA process. They will relax their CRA lending in underserved
62
63

Banking Act of 1933 is also commonly known as Glass-Steagall Act.
There are 8,600 small banks and thrifts in urban and rural areas, which are 80 percent of all banks and thrifts.
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communities for four years, and then hustle to make loans the last year before a ‘twice in a
decade’ CRA exam.
Disclosure of CRA agreements CRA agreements64 typically involves cash payments, grants or
pledges to extend certain volume of loans to targeted groups and/or communities. Schwartz
[1998] provides a detail review of the components of and considerations involved in CRA
agreements. Since the early 1980’s, community organization and financial institutions have
entered into over 300 CRA agreements [Bostic and Robinson 2003]. The FMA enhances CRA
data reporting requirements by requiring disclosure of CRA agreements. Section 711 of the FMA
is known as “CRA Sunshine Requirements” [see 66 Federal Register]. This is a disclosure and
reporting requirement placed on the parties involved in the CRA agreements. This provision
requires each bank and each non-bank party to a CRA agreement to make an annual public report
on how the money and other resources involved in the agreement were used. In addition, the
requirement also describes how the parties to the agreement would make the agreement available
to public and report it to the appropriate agency.
With regards to the CRA related pledges, Bostic and Robinson [2003] finds that CRA
agreements have helped increase the flow of loans into LMI communities involved in the
agreements. They also find evidence suggesting that this increase in lending represents new loans
as opposed to redistribution of loans across communities, but these loans are relatively shortlived65. They believe that the effectiveness of CRA agreements in increasing lending activity
64

For purposes of CRA sunshine requirement, the term ‘agreement’—
(a) means—
(i) any written contract, written arrangement, or other written understanding that provides for cash payments,
grants, or other consideration with a value in excess of $10,000, or for loans the aggregate amount of principal of
which exceeds $50,000, annually; or
(ii) a group of substantively related contracts with an aggregate value of cash payments, grants, or other
consideration in excess of $10,000, or with an aggregate amount of loan principal in excess of $50,000, annually;
made pursuant to, or in connection with, the fulfillment of the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977, at least 1
party to which is an insured depository institution or affiliate thereof, whether organized on a profit or not-forprofit basis; and
(b) does not include—
(i) any individual mortgage loan;
(ii) any specific contract or commitment for a loan or extension of credit to individuals, businesses, farms, or
other entities, if the funds are loaned at rates not substantially below market rates and if the purpose of the loan or
extension of credit does not include any re-lending of the borrowed funds to other parties; or
(iii) any agreement entered into by an insured depository institution or affiliate with a nongovernmental entity or
person who has not commented on, testified about, or discussed with the institution, or otherwise contacted the
institution, concerning the Community Reinvestment Act of 1977. Therefore, agreements entered into by entities
or persons that solicit charitable contributions or other funds without regard to CRA do not constitute CRA
agreements.
65
According to Bostic and Robinson [2003], lenders view CRA agreements as a form of insurance against
potentially large and unknown costs associated with fair lending violations, poor CRA rating and adverse
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ultimately determined by the persistence and sophistication of community groups. Reporting
requirements of the FMA, however, might have discouraged many of these groups who enter
into the agreements with CRA covered lenders [see NCRC 2000].
The passage of FMA reflects the growing trends of the financial industry that enhanced the
emergence of large size, vertically integrated institutions that can perform whole range of
financial activities. Economies of scale, scope and efficient use of resources are the rationales
behind this trend. The growing trends in the banking sector prompted by FMA may have
implications for the enforcement and performance evaluation of CRA. For example, depository
banks and non-banks such as insurance company or mortgage lenders are markedly different for
the purpose of CRA enforcement. While banks’ activities in their assessment areas are
stringently examined under CRA, banks’ activities outside the assessment area are not examined
very strictly and non-banks’ activities are not examined at all. Since common ownership allows
substitution of assets between depositories and their non-bank affiliates, this substitution may
make CRA enforcement weak and ineffective. Since non-banks are not covered under CRA, if
loans that are not qualified for CRA credit are shifted to the portfolio of non-banks, and all LMI
loans are transferred to the portfolio of CRA-covered institutions then this portfolio substitution
will improve CRA performance of banks without any real change in the LMI lending.66 In
addition, current CRA regulations allow banks to selectively include lending activities of their
non-bank affiliates in order to bolster their CRA performance. This selective inclusion provision
may undermine the effectiveness of CRA enforcement and may unduly inflate CRA ratings of
lenders.
Some suggest that consolidation and merger activities facilitated by financial deregulation have a
disproportionate impact on lending in LMI and minority neighborhoods. “Due to bank and thrift
failures, closures, and mergers, the number of small, independent financial institutions operating
in the US has declined substantially, particularly in low-income urban areas, and this trend can
be expected to continue [Papadimiuiou et. al. 1993].” Caskey [1992] study on five major cities
finds that Black- and/or Hispanic-dominated neighborhoods are substantially less67 likely to have

publicity from CRA related protests. Since lenders might only need the ‘insurance’ for a short period, such as
during the course of a merger or other application, these loans can be relatively short-lived.
66
FMA requires that for larger institution like bank holding company to acquire a subsidiary institution, the to-beacquired subsidiary must maintain a satisfactory CRA rating. There is no such requirement for acquiring nonbanks that are not covered by CRA.
67
The mean number of banks (including branches) per census tract with a majority of blacks and/or Hispanics is
less than half that of “non-minority” tracts.
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a local bank. In addition, Caskey study finds some evidence of disproportionate impact of bank
closures on low-income and minority neighborhoods. More recently, Avery [1997] study finds
that although the number of banking offices have increased during the 20-year study period, the
number of banking offices in low-income neighborhoods fell by 21 percent and the number of
offices per capita in low-income area fell by 6.4 percent.
Some researchers, however, believe that local and independent banks, especially in LMI and
minority community serve an essential function to increase the flow of credit into their
communities. They believe that local lenders are in a unique position to collect and gather vital
information about neighborhoods and lending opportunities in these neighborhoods [see Haag
2000]. This information base is essential for residential and business lending, especially in the
LMI neighborhoods where application of non-traditional underwriting standards may be more
appropriate. “Successful lower-income residential lending programs often rely upon techniques
and procedures that require local presence and flexible decision making. These might include the
use of flexible underwriting standards, nontraditional measures of credit quality, a variety of
credit enhancements, or intensive monitoring of outstanding loans that all depend upon
knowledge local neighborhoods, and economic conditions and credit risk factors specific to the
local community [Haag 2000].”
Mergers of local lenders to larger and distant organizations take away the underwriting authority
from local lenders and may adversely impact local information base, vital communication and
trust between lenders and local businesses. All these may result in decreased credit availability,
increased price and unfavorable terms of the loans offered in the community. “The transfer of
bank ownership outside of the local community often means the transfer of the locus of decision
making outside the local community as well, potentially defeating many of the procedures that
can make lending to lower-income and minority populations viable [Haag 2000].” The empirical
study by Lin supports this argument and finds that the probability of mortgage denial rises
significantly with the increase in distance between borrowers and lender. This finding is stronger
for minority and female borrowers [see Lin 2001].
Reform Initiatives After 2001
In order to assess the effectiveness of 1995 reforms and to address changes in the lending
industry and marketplace since the last reform, in July 2001 regulators published an Advance
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (ANPR) [66 Federal Register]. In the ANPR, regulators sought
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inputs on all aspects68 of the CRA regulations from interested parties to assist them in
determining whether and how the CRA regulations should be revised. Within the comment
period that ended on October 17, 2001, the regulators received about 400 comments compared to
6700 comments received during their 1993 request. This substantial reduction of comments may
suggest relative satisfaction with the 1995 reforms or it might also reflect the high fixed cost of
instituting new regulations and to get all relevant parties accustomed with it.
In February 2004, regulators released their latest ANPR [69 Federal Register]. After reviewing
comments received in response to 2001 ANPR, the regulators surmised “the regulations are
essentially sound, but are in need of some updating to keep pace with changes in the financial
services industry [69 Federal Register].” In the 2004 ANPR, regulators proposed amendments to
the existing regulations in three areas69 and sought comments from all interested parties
including public and regulated financial institutions on the proposed amendments or other
aspects of CRA regulations. Salient features of the proposed amendments in the 2004 ANPR are
summarized in the below:
Redefinition of Small Lending Institutions: In the 1995 final regulation, an institution with
less than 250 million of total asset at the yearend in either of the two previous years was
considered as small institution. In case of an institution that is an affiliate of a Bank Holding
Company (BHC), this definition had an added requirement based on the asset size of the BHC. In
that, the total bank and thrift asset of the BHC needed to be less than 1 billion for the institution
to be considered a small institution [see endnote for definition]. In the regulation, small
institutions were evaluated under a streamlined test that focused primarily on lending
performance. As mentioned before, this size specific test allowed regulators to account for
varying capacity of institutions to undertake certain activities that are related to the size. Two
significant reliefs provided by the streamlined test are: (a) streamlined test had no independent
68

Although regulators sought comments on all aspects of possible CRA reforms, they outlined eight broad issues
that may warrant future review. Those issues were:
1. Large Retail Institutions: Lending, Investment, and Service Tests
2. Small Institutions: The Streamlined Small Institution Evaluation
3. Limited Purpose and Wholesale Institutions: The Community Development Test
4. Strategic Plan
5. Performance Context
6. Assessment Areas
7. Activities of Affiliates
8. Data Collection and Maintenance of Public Files
Detail questions involving each of the above issue are summarized in the endnote [2001 Reform]
69
These two areas are (1) Redefinition of small lending institutions, (2) Provision against abusive or predatory
lending and (3) Enhancement of the public performance evaluation as discussed in this section.

72

investment test component and (b) small institutions were not required to collect and report data
applicable for large institutions. The 1995 revision argued that this relieves would fulfill CRA
reform objectives by providing performance-based assessment standards that minimize
compliance burden while stimulating improved performance.
In the 2001 comment period, financial institutions expressed concern about fierce competition
for qualified investments among large institutions to perform well on CRA investment test. This
competition can become a substantial burden to institutions that are just above the threshold size.
These marginal institutions also complained about the burden of data collection and reporting
requirements, which according to these institutions had impeded their ability to improve their
CRA performance. In the 2004 ANPR, regulators have proposed redefinition of small institutions
in the following way:
1. The proposed regulation raises the small institution asset threshold from 250 million to
500 million.
2. The proposed regulation eliminates asset size limitation of BHC all together on small
institution eligibility.
This change will reduce the number of institution subject to the large retail institution test by
half, but the percentage of industry assets subject to large retail institution test would decline
only slightly. One of the rationales70 for this change is that this decline will align the current
distribution of asset between small and large institution with the distribution that was anticipated
when the definition of small institution was adopted.
Provision against Predatory Lending: In the 2004 ANPR, regulators expressed the need to
enhance CRA regulations to address abusive and predatory lending practices that are inconsistent
with helping to meet the community credit needs in a safe and sound manner. In doing so,
regulators propose the following:
1. Specify a list of examples71 of violations of certain anti-discriminatory and consumer
protection act that will adversely affect an institution’s CRA performance.
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The other rationales for the redefinition of small institution can be summarized as follows:
1. Consolidation in the lending industry through mergers and acquisition has increased the gap between
smallest and largest institutions substantially since the line drawn at 250-million asset threshold in 1995.
Due fixed nature of the
2. Number of institutions defined as small and their relative asset compared to industry asset size has
declined substantially in recent years since the threshold was set.
3. Some of the asset growth of small institution since 1995 was due to inflation, not real growth.
71
Examples of such violation include:
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2. Propose that abusive lending activity like equity stripping72 with respect to home
mortgage and consumer loans would adversely affect CRA performance of lenders
engaging in such action.
3. Propose that an institution’s evaluation will be adversely affected by discriminatory,
other illegal, or abusive credit practices described in the regulation regardless of whether
the practices involve loans in the institution’s assessment area or in any other location.
4. Propose that an institution’s evaluation will be adversely affected by discriminatory,
other illegal or abusive credit practices by any affiliate if the affiliate loan is elected for
consideration in the CRA evaluation.
Enhancement of the Public Performance Evaluations: In the 2004 ANPR, the regulators
proposed to use publicly available HMDA and CRA data to disclose following information in the
public performance evaluation at the assessment area level:
1. The number, type and amount of purchased loans.
2. The number, type and amount of HOEPA loans and of loans for which rate spread
information is reported under HMDA73.
3. The number, type and amount of loans that were originated or purchased by an affiliate
and included in the institution’s evaluation and the identity of such affiliate.

VI. Assessment of the Past Revisions and Future Trends of CRA
Legislative debates on CRA modifications, past revisions of the act by the regulators and
enforcement of the regulations on lending institutions indicate certain principles. Based on these
principles and the present status of CRA regulations, we can speculate about future areas of
change. These principles and future areas of change are summarized as below:
a.

Discrimination against applicants on a prohibited basis in violation of Equal Credit Opportunity Act
(ECOA) or Fair Housing Act.
b. Evidence of illegal referral practices in violation of section 8 of the Real Estate Settlement Procedures
Act (RESPA).
c. Evidence of violations of the Truth in Lending Act (TILA) concerning a consumer’s right to rescind a
credit transaction secured by a principal residence.
d. Evidence of violation of the Home Ownership and Equity Protection Act (HOEPA).
e. Evidence of unfair or deceptive credit practices in violation of section 5 of the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) Act.
72
A practice of extending loans based predominantly on the foreclosure or liquidation value of the collateral by
the institution, where the borrower cannot be expected to be able to make the payments required under the terms
of the loan. An institution may determine whether a borrower can be expected to be able to make the required
payments based on information about borrower’s credit history, current of expected income, other resources and
debts, preexisting customer relationships, or other information ordinarily considered by the institution.
73
This information will be available in HMDA data starting from 2005.
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The original CRA proclaimed that safety and soundness should be the prime consideration in
lending decision. Lenders should consider all other factors, including conforming with CRA
requirements, once the safety and soundness of operation criteria is fulfilled. In addition, CRA
was not intended to allocate or limit the flow credit to any geographic area based on any criteria,
including volume of deposit, minority population, average income levels or type of loans. The
act was not intended to disrupt the competitive flow of credit in the market.
CRA is not a prohibitive law; instead, it is an affirmative law. The act does not outlaw any
actions or behaviors on the part of lenders, rather it reminds the lending institutions of their
charter obligations. CRA intends to ensure that lenders do not ignore good borrowing prospects
in the community just because borrowers or the businesses are located in the community
dominated by LMI populations and treat creditworthy borrowers evenhandedly.
CRA is not intended to be a race-based legislation; instead, it is an income-based or need-based
legislation. The act does not exclusively protect any racial minority, but rather the legislative
protection of the act covers all borrowers, and everyone who lives in the LMI neighborhood,
including the whites. Despite some researchers’ broad generalization of aligning CRA with other
anti-discrimination legislations, the act should not be considered as a race-based law. Doing so
distorts the primary objective of the act, and reduces its appeal and bipartisan political support.
The act intends to provide flexibility to lenders so that they can formulate a CRA strategy to
address their community-specific needs according to their size, capability and other market
constraints. However, the ‘flexibility’ and ‘specificity of the guideline’ can become two
conflicting policy objectives. Due to this potential conflict, CRA will continue to require a
delicate balance between ‘flexibility’ and ‘consistency’. The examiner’s judgment will play an
important role to keep CRA flexible. This judgment, however, cannot be arbitrary. Unlimited
discretion may produce inconsistent CRA examinations. On the other extreme, removing all
discretion from the CRA examiners will hurt the objective of CRA by making it a mechanism for
credit allocation. Improved examination standards, extensive interagency examiner training and
standardization of evaluation will go a long way toward keeping this balance.
The definition of ‘Community’ may be becoming irrelevant in the present context of financial
deregulations. In today’s market, we need a better way to define community so that CRA may
continue to serve its original role, which is to require lenders to ‘help meet the credit needs of the
entire community’. At the time when CRA was enacted, the location of the community and
depository lenders were inter-linked; every lender had its own unique community. That link,
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however, has eroded in the present financial environment. Many lenders have defined
‘community’ or ‘communities’ based on the spatial location around its branches and ATMs,
although they make substantial loans outside their community directly or through their non-bank
affiliates. However, under the current system, CRA performance of the loans outside the
community is not strictly examined and the lending through non-bank affiliates is not examined
at all unless lender elects to be examined. By changing the definition of community to reflect
modern lending practices, these loans and their CRA performance can be bought under CRA
regulatory reach. In the 2004 proposed rules, the regulators considered several proposals74 for
redefining community, but decided to continue to adopt the community definition adopted in the
1995 regulation [Federal Register 2004].
The coverage of CRA may need to be reconsidered. Dramatic changes in the mortgage market
operations have affected CRA in a substantial way. Depository lenders are no longer the
dominant players in the mortgage market. Moreover, the rationale for exclusively requiring
depository lenders to help meet the credit needs of their community has become weaker. For
example, these lenders are not the only receivers of deposits in the community, and they are not
the sole beneficiaries of the government’s implicit protection. These changes suggest broadening
of the coverage of CRA to include the institutions that are not currently covered. For example,
credit unions are not covered by the act because they lacked the ability and/or the incentive to
neglect their "communities" of members. They were not-for-profit, relatively small, and limited
to serving people who shared a single "common bond." In the last two decades, the definition of
what constitutes a "common bond", however, has expanded dramatically. Some argue that
because of the redefined the “common bond" requirement, credit unions now have the ability and
the incentive to engage in the same type of lending practice that led Congress to impose the CRA
upon banks [see Cassity 2000]. Similarly, the argument to include non-banks like mortgage
banks, mutual funds, pension funds, insurance companies, investment companies consumer
finance under CRA coverage is stronger under present financial environment. Since financial
institutions can own banks and non-banks under the same ownership, keeping non-banks beyond
the regulatory reach of CRA may provide incentive to modify lenders’ portfolio in a manner that
may undermine the purpose of CRA.
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Some proposals include, assessment area should include (1) all areas in which CRA covered lenders deliver
retail banking service [proposed by National Association of Home Builders (NAHB) in 2001] and (2) areas in
which lenders have made more than a 0.5 percent of all home purchase and/or refinance loans [proposed by
National Community Reinvestment Coalition (NCRC) in 2001].
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CRA investment test for the large retail institutions needs further restructuring. Several important
issues relating to investment test must be kept in mind in this restructuring effort. Qualified
investments should be considered in the CRA evaluation to the extent they help meet community
credit needs. The stand-alone investment test requires examiners to grade lenders on investment
activities. However, there is an intense competition for these investments due to limited supply
of such investment in neighborhoods. This competition for investments has depressed yields,
effectively transforming investments into grants and forcing lenders to make equity investments
just to pass in the investment test. Regulators correctly realized this inefficient behavior and
promised in the 2004 ANPR to provide additional interagency guidance to clarify that the
investment test is not intended to be a source of pressure on institutions to make imprudent
equity investments. Regulators also realize “it is inevitable that supply of, demand for, and
quality investment opportunities will vary by region and city; the performance evaluation is
supposed to take those variations into account [Federal Register 2004].” Since investments are
not directly related to community credit needs, lenders or regulators have no way to determine
community investment needs. Therefore, it is essentially up to lenders to decide the level of
investment activities based on its capacity and opportunity in the community. CRA regulations
should clearly specify this and make investment optional providing incentives to engage in
investment activities but not requiring it. One of the possible approaches is to provide credit for
qualified investment in the lending test. Currently, loan purchases are given the same weight as
loan originations. Similar or some variable weights75 should be attached to investment activities.
In the 2004 ANPR, the regulators have considered some alternative approaches and decided to
continue to keep mandatory investment test based on several justifications. These justifications
include, (a) changing the structure of the large retail institution test would simply substitute one
set of implementation challenges with another and would not necessarily yield a substantial
benefit, (b) investment test has contributed to the substantial growth of the market for
community development oriented investments and (c) replacement of investment test would
change market expectation and would incur substantial implementation cost to get adjusted with
the new revisions. However, none of these justifications is based on solid ground. First, making
the investment test not only affects the implementation of the act, rather this change would shift
examination weights from investment to lending – the original focus of CRA. This may
completely change the ratings distribution for the large retail institutions. Shifting of incentive to
75

Depending on the extent to which the particular investment satisfies community credit needs.
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lending may have dramatic effects on community lending and satisfying community credit
needs. The regulators need to conduct a rigorous and careful study to figure out the net benefit of
this change in regulation. Second, investment test may have created a new market for community
development investment and helped spread institutional risk, but CRA is not the only vehicle,
and of course, not the primary vehicle to provide incentive to achieve this goal. Finally, if
adjustment cost is given precedence without conducting a careful study on the benefits, there will
never be a time to revise this regulation.
Innovativeness and complexity of qualified investment is one of the four performance criteria in
the investment test. However, in a performance-based evaluation system this criteria not only
redundant, but also potentially unproductive creating examination process unnecessarily
burdensome, unrealistic and often impossible to account for. Comments in the 2001 ANPR
rightly pointed out the ambiguity in measuring the degree of innovativeness or complexity, and
more importantly asked clarification whether these criteria a means for community lending or an
end in itself. In other words, is it necessary to be innovative and complex, if non-innovative and
simple investments appropriately meet community credit needs? Of course, the innovativeness or
complex are not the goal or end. Regulators agreed to make this point clear through further
guidance. However, I believe regulators do not need to clarify this criterion, but should eliminate
this criterion. In an outcome-based evaluation system that focuses on the actual performance, this
criterion is redundant and inconsistent. Performance-based evaluation was introduced in 1995
regulation to make the evaluation process more objective, simple and measurable.
Outcome over process will continue to remain the major theme of the future reforms of CRA.
The central question facing the regulators is, ‘how to modernize CRA to make it relevant and
effective under the current banking system?’ The Joint Center for Housing Studies [Ford
Foundation 2002], proposes two possible directions for future CRA reform: (1) Extension of
assessment area to cover larger share of the lending of CRA-regulated entities, and extension of
CRA to include newly emerging non-bank financial services organizations (2) Extension of CRA
to give greater emphasis to the provision of financial services to lower-income borrowers. I
believe that extension of CRA coverage to non-banks like, credit unions and possibly mortgage
companies is consistent with the structural changes in the banking industry. However, any
extension of CRA credits to influence lending activities must be carefully considered such that
this extension is consistent with the original focus of CRA.
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Final Remarks
In this paper, I have focused on the historic evolution, present status and future trends of the
Community Reinvestment Act (CRA). In doing so, I have discussed pre-CRA, anti-redlining
legislations and their effectiveness in resisting disproportionate and often discriminatory
allocation of lending based on geography. I have taken an objective look at the provisions and
enforcement mechanisms of the original CRA and have considered the points of views of those
affected by the act. Specifically, I have considered the views of the regulators, the lending
institutions, and the community groups and individuals. Finally, I have analyzed reforms and
legislative developments relating to the act and their economic implications. This analysis
provides a framework to understand the past and present status of CRA. In light of this
framework, we may seek to address some of the possible future research trends concerning the
act.
Estimating the impact of CRA may be difficult. Disentangling the effects of CRA from the
effects of other concurrent activities and legislation poses an important challenge to the future
researchers. Some of these concurrent effects include the influence of other fair lending and antidiscriminatory laws, effects of the streamlined secondary market operations, effects of FHA
guaranteed home mortgages, effects of the GSEs in purchasing conventional home mortgage
loans from mortgage originators, or the effects of the deductibility of interest paid on a home
mortgage from the federal income tax. Despite these difficulties, several attempts to examine the
impact of CRA on lending to LMI borrowers and areas are noteworthy [see Shlay 1999,
Schwartz 1998, Avery et. al. 1999, Evanoff and Segal 1996]. Some of these studies suggest that
CRA-covered lenders and their affiliates have increased their market share in prime lending to
LMI borrowers and areas than lenders not covered under CRA. This pattern generally suggests
that CRA has positively influenced the growth of LMI lending. Detailed multivariate analysis
conducted by the Joint Center for Housing Studies at Harvard University for Ford Foundation
[Ford Foundation 2002] confirms that CRA-regulated lenders originate a higher proportion of
loans to lower-income people and community than they would if CRA did not exist.
Additionally, lower-income neighborhoods targeted by CRA appear to have more rapid price
increases and higher property sales rates than other neighborhoods – a finding consistent with the
proposition that CRA has expanded the provision of mortgage capital to these neighborhoods.
CRA can become an effective tool to deter predatory lending. CRA examination needs to
consider the price and terms of the loans extended to the LMI borrowers and neighborhoods. By
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structuring CRA credits in a way that lender receive no credits or negative credits for predatory
loans, the act might play an important role in reducing predatory lending. Current proposal
relating to predatory lending One of the important policy issues relating to CRA is to understand
the role of the non-availability of depository lenders in the LMI neighborhoods on the emergence
and growth of predatory lenders.
CRA might have produced positive information spillovers, and reduced market failures
associated with lack of information. No theoretical work has looked at the impact of CRA
induced informational benefits on mortgage underwriting. Existence and nature of information
externalities over space in the context of mortgage market needs to be explored. Furthermore,
there is a need for a basic and simple model that would be able to combine imperfect information
and associated credit rationing, and information externalities in the context of mortgage market
with the mortgage underwriting to analyze CRA.
CRA can be made more market-based. One such approach put forward by Richardson [2000]
and Klausner [1995] proposes tradable CRA permits. According to tradable CRA permit
literature, CRA credits would be bought and sold in the open market for CRA permits. Lenders
with more than required CRA credits76 would sell their excess credits to lenders with less than
required CRA credits. Like tradable pollution permits, in doing so CRA permits will provide
market based incentives to efficient CRA lenders77 with valuable local information base to make
optimum level of loans, which will be more loans than they currently make. This approach
would also allow to non-CRA lenders to make their optimum CRA loans and concentrate their
resource to other loans, in which they possess higher expertise. In this context, one might also
want to compare the efficiency of currently administered CRA with a monopolistic lender.
Although this lender would have larger dead weight loss due to its monopolistic nature, but it
will have lower loan production cost due to larger informational set.
CRA has undergone numerous changes. Some of these changes were substantial and sweeping,
while some were not so dramatic. These changes were largely in response to the reaction of those
affected by the act, and the changing condition of the financial products and delivery of those
products. These changes have transformed CRA from a dormant legislation to a vibrant act that
has become one of the most significant tools for community activists in their community
development and regeneration efforts. This simple and flexible act allowed active participation
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The required CRA credit to comply with the act would be set by the regulators.
Lenders who specialize in loans to the LMI borrowers or in the LMI neighborhoods that qualify for CRA
credits.
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of community members, who often know more about their community than the legislators or the
regulators. These changes through a dynamic process of reactions and resolution of conflicts
have kept and will continue to keep CRA relevant and effective.
However, in resolving conflicts and in seeking necessary updating, the guiding principle should
be historic objective of the act – to ensure that lender fulfills their affirmative obligation to help
meet the credit needs of their entire community including low- and moderate-income individuals
and neighborhoods. Access to credit for the poor through responsible lending is the objective of
CRA and is probably the key to alleviate poverty as well, and it should be just that.

Endnotes:
1. Low- and moderate-income (LMI) neighborhood defined by FFIEC regulation refers to census tracts that, as
of the latest decennial census, have median family incomes of less than 80 percent of the median family income of
the metropolitan area in which they are located.
2. FHA Loans The Federal Housing Administration (FHA) loans are intended as a means to facilitate borrowers,
usually LMI and/or first time buyers, to get a loan with less down payment and liberal qualifying standards. The
FHA sets guidelines for the approval, closing, and insurance of these loans. These rules are more liberal in
underwriting standards compared to the conventional loans. However, insurance by the full faith and credit of the
United States government removes substantial default risk away these loans. Without this insurance, most lenders
would be reluctant to make loans with such liberal underwriting criteria. FHA loan applications are taken by lenders
that are approved by the Federal Housing Administration. These lenders can approve and close the loan, and apply
for insurance coverage from the FHA. With that insurance in place, the loan can then be sold to the secondary
market as a government-insured loan.
3. Small institution. A small institution is defined as an institution with total assets of less than $250 million that
is independent or in affiliated a holding company that with total bank and thrift assets of less than $1 billion as of the
two preceding year ends.
4.

Application for federal approval. Application for approval includes:
a. Federal charters
b. Federal deposit insurance
c. Establishment of domestic branches of regulated institutions
d. Relocation of home or branch of regulated institutions
e. Merger, consolidation and acquisition of assets or shares or assumption of liabilities of financial institutions
requiring regulatory approval

5.

Detailed performance factors that remained effective since 1989 revision through 1997 are given below:
Category A: Ascertainment of community credit needs
1. Bank’s activities to ascertain community credit needs.
2. Extent of the board of director’s participation in reviewing policies relating to CRA.
Category B: Marketing and types of credit offered and extended
3. Bank’s marketing efforts designed to inform the community about bank’s credit-related services, including
special programs.
4. Bank’s origination or purchases of local community home mortgages, home improvement and
rehabilitation loans, and small business and farm loans.
5. Bank’s participation in government-assisted housing programs.
Category C: Geographic distribution and record of opening and closing offices

81

6. Geographic distribution of credit applications, approvals, and denials.
7. Bank’s record of opening and closing branches and providing services at branches.
Category D: Discrimination and other illegal credit practice
8. Any practices designed to discourage consumer applications for certain credit programs.
9. Evidence of other discrimination or other illegal credit practices.
Category E: Community development
10. Bank’s participation in local community development projects and programs.
11. Bank’s ability to meet local credit needs based on bank size, financial condition and other limitations.
12. Other relevant factors, which could bear upon the extent to which the bank is helping to meet the credit
needs of the community.
6. Community Development Loans have community development as its primary purpose. As defined in the
regulations, community development means –
a. Affordable housing (including multifamily rental housing) for LMI individuals
b. Community services targeted to LMI individuals
c. Activities that promote economic development by financing businesses or farms that meet the size
eligibility standards of the Small Business Administration’s Development Company or Small Business
Investment Company programs (13 CFR 121.301) or have gross annual revenue of $1 million or less
d. Activities that revitalize or stabilize LMI geographies.
7. Small-business and Small-farm Loans: Small-business loans are defined as loans whose original amounts are
$1 million or less and that were reported on the institution’s Call Report or TFR as either “Loans secured by nonfarm or nonresidential real estate” or “Commercial and industrial loans.” Small-farm loans are defined as loans
whose original amounts are $500,000 or less and were reported as either “Loans to finance agricultural production
and other loans to farmers” or “Loans secured by farmland.”
8.

Performance Criteria and Factors for Large Retail Banks

Performance Criteria
A. Lending Test
1. Lending activity.
2. Geographic distribution.
3. Borrower characteristics.
4. Community development lending.
5. Use of innovative or flexible lending practices.

B. Investment Test
1. The number and dollar amount of qualified investment.

Performance Factors
1. Lending activity
2. Geographic distribution
3. Borrower characteristics
4. Community development lending
5. Innovativeness or flexibility of product
6. Concentration of loans in the assessment area
7. Responsiveness to credit needs of LMI
individuals and geographies and small business.
1. Investment and grant activities

2. Innovativeness and complexity of qualified investment.

2. Responsiveness to credit and community development needs.

3. Degree to which these types of investments not routinely
provided by other private investors.

3. Community development initiatives

4. Responsiveness of qualified investments to available
opportunities.
C. Service Test
1. The distribution of branches among LMI geographies.
2. The institution’s record of opening and closing branches.

1. Accessibility of delivery system
2. Record of opening and closing of branches
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3. The availability and effectiveness of alternative systems
for delivering retail banking services.

3. Reasonableness of business hours and services in
meeting assessment area’s needs.

4. The extent to which the institution provides community
development services.
5. The innovativeness and responsiveness of community
development services.
6. The range and accessibility of services provided in LMI
geographies.

4. Community development services

9. 2001 Reform: Detail question(s) involving eight broad reform issues identified by the regulators were as
follows:
a. Large Retail Institutions: Lending, Investment, and Service Tests: Do the regulations strike the appropriate
balance between quantitative and qualitative measures, and among lending, investments, and services? If
so, why? If not, how should the regulations be revised?
b. Small Institutions: The Streamlined Small Institution Evaluation: Are the small institution performance
standards effective in evaluating such institutions' CRA performance? If so, why? If not, how should the
regulations be revised?
c. Limited Purpose and Wholesale Institutions: The Community Development Test:
1. Are the definitions of ``wholesale institutions'' and `limited purpose institution' appropriate? If so,
why? If not, how should the regulations be revised?
2. Does the community development test provide a reasonable and sufficient standard for assessing
wholesale and limited purpose institutions? If so, why? If not, how should the regulations be revised?
3. Would the community development test provide a reasonable and sufficient standard for assessing the
CRA record of other insured depository institutions, including retail institutions? If so, why and which
ones, and how should the regulations be revised? If not, why not?
d. Strategic Plan: Does the strategic plan option provide an effective alternative method of evaluation for
financial institutions? If so, why? If not, how should the regulations be revised?
e. Performance Context: Are the provisions on performance context effective in appropriately shaping the
quantitative and qualitative evaluation of an institution's record of helping to meet the credit needs of its
entire community? If so, why? If not, how should the regulations be revised?
f. Assessment Areas: Do the provisions on assessment areas, which are tied to geographies surrounding
physical deposit-gathering facilities, provide a reasonable and sufficient standard for designating the
communities within which the institution's activities will be evaluated during an examination?
g. Activities of Affiliates: Are the provisions on affiliate activities, which permit consideration of an
institution's affiliates' activities at the option of the institution, effective in evaluating the performance of
the institution in helping to meet the credit needs of its entire community, and consistent with the CRA
statute?
h. Data Collection and Maintenance of Public Files: Are the data collection and reporting and public file
requirements effective and efficient approaches for assessing an institution's CRA performance while
minimizing burden? If so, why? If not, how should the regulations be revised?
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